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A huge literature contemplates the theoretical relationship between judicial 
deference and agency rulemaking. But relatively little empirical work has studied 
the actual effect of deference on how agencies draft regulations. As a result, some 
of the most important questions surrounding deference—whether it encourages 
agencies to focus on policy analysis instead of legal analysis, its relationship to 
procedures like notice and comment—have so far been dominated by conjecture 
and anecdote. 
Because Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
applied simultaneously across agencies, it has been difficult to separate its specific 
causal effect from other contemporaneous events in the 1980s, like the rise of cost-
benefit analysis and the new textualism. This Article contends with this problem 
by exploiting a unique event in administrative law: the Supreme Court’s 2011 
decision in Mayo Foundation v. United States, which required that courts apply 
Chevron deference to interpretative tax regulations. By altering the deference 
regime applicable to one specific category of regulation, Mayo created a natural 
experiment with a treatment group (interpretative tax regulations) and a control 
group (all other regulations).  
This Article uses natural language processing and various statistical methods 
to evaluate the causal effect of Chevron deference.  These techniques allow the 
Article to analyze a dataset of 69,956 regulations in a transparent and replicable 
manner. The Article finds that, after Mayo, the Department of the Treasury 
shifted its explanations for new tax rules to focus more on normative policy 
concerns and less on statutory interpretation. These results are statistically 
significant and large in magnitude: a 137.3% increase in language discussing 
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normative goals (like efficiency and fairness) and a 48.5% decrease in language 
discussing the underlying statute.  
In addition, the Article introduces a new theoretical model in which greater 
judicial deference encourages agencies to exert more effort in following 
rulemaking procedures. It hypothesizes that agencies counterintuitively view 
greater procedural effort as the “price” of judicial deference, a price that is more 
worth paying when courts are more deferential. Empirical analysis supports this 
hypothesis, finding that the move to Chevron deference caused a 18.9% increase 
in the length of regulatory preambles and a 35.8% increase in the intensity of 
preambles’ discussion of public comments.  
These results cast new light on the debate over Chevron, suggesting that 
Chevron makes agency rulemaking more detailed and policy-focused. This raises 
the stakes of a potential Chevron reversal and clarifies the arguments of its 
supporters and critics. Ultimately, this Article underscores the importance of 
judicial deference regimes in shaping agency behavior. 
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Introduction 
Chevron1 deference is under attack. Although Chevron is the most-cited 
administrative law case of all time2 and one of the most important Supreme Court 
cases of any kind,3 judges,4 legislators,5 and scholars.6 over the past decade have 
increasingly called for its reversal. The appointments of Chevron-skeptical 
 
1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2. Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking 
Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014). 
3. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (describing Chevron as “the most-cited case in 
modern public law”). 
4. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (“[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to 
reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that 
decision.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2129 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In recent years, several Members of 
this Court have questioned Chevron’s foundations.”); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. 
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describing Chevron as “a judge-made 
doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory 
Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154 (2016) (criticizing Chevron as “indeterminate” and “antithetical 
to the neutral, impartial rule of law”).  
5. Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016) (proposing to repeal 
deference by requiring courts to “decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies”); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 
2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016) (same). 
6. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 316 (2014) (“[T]he 
deference to [administrative] interpretation is an abandonment of judicial office . . . .”); Jack M. Beermann, End 
the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010). Many other scholars have observed, but not necessarily encouraged, the decline of 
Chevron. Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2015) 
(“[R]eports of Chevron’s death seemed to get significant confirmation at the end of the Supreme Court’s 2014-
2015 Term . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Without Chevron, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 60 (“It seems clear that 
Chevron is entering a period of serious reconsideration. In the fullness of time, it might be seriously qualified or 
even abandoned.”); Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 727 (2007) (describing “Chevron’s demise”).  
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Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court have inspired fresh 
arguments about judicial deference in general and Chevron deference in 
particular. 
But despite the enormous volume of scholarly literature on Chevron,7 almost 
no empirical work has studied the effect of Chevron on agencies themselves. The 
only study so far to address this question—Christopher Walker’s survey of agency 
rule drafters—was inconclusive,8 leaving judges and policymakers in the dark 
about Chevron’s actual effects. 
One common critique of Chevron is that it encourages “executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power.”9 
More specifically, critics like Justice Thomas argue that it empowers agencies “not 
to find the best meaning of the text, but to formulate legally binding rules to fill 
in gaps based on policy judgments made by the agency rather than Congress.”10 
This view is shared by many scholars, both critics and supporters of Chevron.11 
They believe that Chevron dramatically transformed agency rulemaking, from the 
province of lawyers seeking the most accurate reading of the statute into the 
province of technocratic agency experts seeking the normatively best policy.12 Yet 
this view has been supported so far primarily by anecdote rather than empirical 
evidence.13 
Another area that has received relatively little attention has been the 
relationship between Chevron deference and the requirements of procedural 
rulemaking, particularly agencies’ responsibilities to conduct notice and comment 
and adequately explain new regulations to the public. These procedures play a 
key role in administrative law—they are thought to increase public engagement, 
democratic accountability, agency legitimacy, the diversity of views considered in 
 
7. Jerry Mashaw once joked that scholars have spilled so much ink over Chevron that it should have 
been issued with its own environmental impact statement. JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND 
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 222 n.19 (1997). 
8. Infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
9. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149-58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit 
executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal 
power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution . . . .”). 
10. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
11. Infra Section I.A. 
12. E.g., E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of 
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (2005) (“Chevron opened up 
and validated a policy making dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the agency should adopt for 
policy reasons, rather than what interpretation the agency must adopt for legal reasons. . . . Chevron has 
increased the weight given to the views of air pollution experts in the air program office relative to the lawyers 
in OGC.”). 
13. Kavanaugh, supra note 4, at 2150 (“From my more than five years of experience at the White 
House, I can confidently say that Chevron encourages the Executive Branch (whichever party controls it) to be 
extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and 
restraints.”); David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“[I]t looks for all the world like agencies choose their policy first and then later seek to 
defend its legality.”); Elliott, supra note 12, at 11-12.  
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the regulatory process, and the quality of the regulation ultimately produced.14 
But scholars have not yet studied Chevron’s role in this process. In theory, 
Chevron is a doctrine of statutory interpretation entirely separate from 
rulemaking procedures, which are dictated by State Farm15 and section 553(c) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).16 Chevron therefore might have no 
effect on agency rulemaking efforts, or it might even discourage agencies from 
detailed compliance by making it less likely that courts will scrutinize agency 
rulemaking at all. 
This Article argues that, counterintuitively, Chevron should encourage 
agencies to exert more effort in complying with rulemaking procedures, rather 
than less. This is because agencies will view procedural effort as essentially the 
price of judicial deference—even if Chevron and rulemaking requirements are 
theoretically separate, investment in procedural compliance is more worthwhile 
if the resulting regulation will receive more deferential review. This Article 
presents a new theoretical model that supports this hypothesis.17 It also argues 
that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has further strengthened the link 
between Chevron deference and notice and comment requirements.18 
On the other hand, many scholars and judges have argued that Chevron’s 
influence is overstated. Some have alleged that Chevron is no more deferential 
than its alternatives: Justice Breyer and former Judge Posner have argued that 
Chevron deference is similar to Skidmore deference,19 while others have argued 
that Chevron’s analysis of reasonableness is indistinguishable from the “arbitrary 
and capricious” analysis required under the APA, independent of Chevron.20 
Moreover, many scholars have empirically found that courts invoke Chevron less 
often than is commonly supposed, and that its influence is minimal even when 
invoked.21 All these perspectives suggest that Chevron might have little or no 
effect—that it might inspire no shift toward a policy focus and might inspire no 
additional procedural effort by agencies. 
The essential problem in conducting causal analysis of Chevron has been the 
absence of a control group. Because, in theory, Chevron applied to all agencies at 
once, we cannot see how agency rulemaking would have developed 
counterfactually. This has made it difficult to separate the effect of Chevron 
 
14. E.g., Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 968-69 (2009) (“In administrative law, the notice-and-comment process serves several 
related functions: providing information to decisionmakers, legitimating the decisionmaking process, and 
constraining decisionmakers by pushing them to confront arguments that point away from their preferred course 
of action.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship 
Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (2015) (describing 
the belief that notice and comment enhances political accountability of agencies as an “obsession” among 
administrative law scholars).  
15. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
16. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018). 
17. Infra Section I.B; Appendix Section A. 
18. Infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
19. Infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
20. Infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
21. Infra Section I.C. 
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specifically from contemporaneous events in the mid-1980s, like the rise of cost-
benefit analysis,22 law and economics,23 and the new textualism.24 
To address this problem, this Article proposes novel treatment and control 
groups: the IRS and other federal agencies. Courts have historically accorded a 
unique, lower degree of deference (National Muffler deference25) to 
“interpretative tax regulations” promulgated under Treasury’s general power to 
make tax regulations.26 This changed in 2011, when the Supreme Court ruled in 
Mayo Foundation v. United States27  that all tax regulations are subject to 
Chevron deference, including interpretative regulations.28 Mayo marked a huge 
shift in administrative tax law, but notably it marked a shift only in tax law, since 
regulations issued by other agencies had long been accorded Chevron deference. 
This Article assembles a dataset comprising all the regulations digitally 
available on FederalRegister.Gov, an official governmental source of federal 
regulations from 2000 to the present. It algorithmically analyzes 69,956 discrete 
agency rules during that period, issued by every federal agency, quantifying 
various aspects of the regulatory preambles used to explain new regulations. It 
evaluates the relative importance of legal analysis and policy analysis by analyzing 
how frequently agencies discuss the relevant statute (reflecting a legal 
orientation) versus normative considerations like fairness and efficiency 
(reflecting a policy orientation). And it measures the effect of Chevron on 
agencies’ procedural effort by examining changes to the length of preambles and 
the frequency with which preambles discuss public comments. By quantifying text 
in this way, the Article facilitates both visual examination of trends and more 
complex statistical analysis. 
The Article finds some evidence that the shift to Chevron deference caused 
the IRS to become more focused on policy issues and less focused on legal issues, 
and to exert greater procedural effort. Estimates of these effects are large in 
magnitude and statistically significant: a 137.3% increase in the frequency of 
normative terms, a 48.5% decrease in the frequency of statutory terms, a 18.9% 
increase in preamble length, and a 35.8% increase in the intensity of discussion of 
public comments.  
Moreover, the Article investigates these results along multiple dimensions. 
Mayo made preambles to interpretative tax regulations more likely to use any 
normative terms at all and less likely to use any statutory terms at all. In addition, 
among interpretative tax preambles that discussed normative concepts (or 
statutory concepts), Mayo increased the intensity of use by increasing the 
 
22. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
23. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983). 
24. Most prominently, Justice Scalia was appointed in 1986 and quickly became a prominent new 
textualist on the modern Court. 
25. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
26. Infra Section I.D. 
27. 562 U.S. 44 (2011). 
28. Infra Section I.D. 
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frequency of normative terms (and decreasing the frequency of statutory terms) 
within each preamble. In contrast, Mayo did not significantly increase the 
likelihood that a preamble referred to public comments at all; but among 
preambles referring to public comments, Mayo substantially increased the 
frequency of those references. The specific form of statistical analysis used in this 
Article therefore allows more sophisticated analysis of Mayo’s effects. 
These results suggest that Chevron has a substantial impact on agency 
rulemaking. They sharpen the positions of Chevron’s critics and supporters, 
underscoring the importance of Chevron and raising the stakes of the current 
debate over judicial deference. They also add to the literature on tax 
exceptionalism by illustrating how tax law’s unique deference regime prior to 
Mayo influenced Treasury’s approach to drafting regulations.  
This Article makes three main contributions to the existing literature on the 
effects of Chevron. First, it empirically supports claims that Chevron pushes 
agencies away from legal questions and toward policy ones. Second, it proposes a 
new theoretical model under which Chevron deference increases agencies’ 
compliance with rulemaking procedures, because those procedures serve as the 
price of heightened deference. Third, it empirically supports the price-of-
deference model, finding that Chevron deference does in fact increase the length 
of regulatory preambles and the extent to which agencies engage with public 
comments. 
Part II discusses the history of and scholarly views on judicial deference and 
introduces the price-of-deference model. Part III describes the empirical methods 
used in this Article, and Part IV presents empirical results. Part V describes 
specification checks that largely support the results in Part IV but that also raise 
some notes of caution, especially with respect to the analysis of preamble length. 
Part VI concludes by discussing the implications of this Article’s findings. The 
Appendix provides additional detail on mathematical proofs, data, and methods. 
I. Chevron, National Muffler, and Rulemaking Style 
A. Rulemaking as Policymaking Rather than Legal Interpretation 
When an administrative agency issues regulations, does it make a legal 
judgment or a policy judgment?29 Does it look to evidence of statutory meaning—
 
29. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2365 
(2018) (contrasting “legal” and “policy” rationales for rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: 
Emphasizing Reasoned Decision-Making in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 
88-90 (1994) (phrasing the choice as between a “formalist or transmission-belt model” under which 
“administrative agencies expediently implement the will of the legislature” and an “expertise model” which 
“emphasizes the experience and technical knowledge of agencies and their staffs”). 
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statutory text and purpose, the intent of Congress30—or does it ask which rule is 
normatively best, regardless of the statute?31  
Chevron seemed to nudge agencies away from a statutory, legal orientation, 
and toward a normative, policy one. The Court held that courts must defer to an 
agency rule so long as the underlying statute is “silent or ambiguous” and the rule 
reflects a “reasonable policy choice.”32 The Court’s decision in Chevron explicitly 
noted that “an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”33 
Donald Elliott, a former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) lawyer, 
recounts that prior to Chevron, the EPA had treated each statute as a 
“prescriptive text having a single meaning, discoverable by specialized legal 
training and tools.”34 After Chevron, the EPA treated statutes as creating “a 
range of permissible interpretive discretion,” within which “[t]he agency’s policy-
makers, not its lawyers, should decide which of several different but legally 
defensible interpretations to adopt.”35  
In the statutory interpretation literature, the pre-Chevron approach is 
sometimes described as the “faithful agent” model, where interpreters do not 
shape the law according to their own preferences, but instead try to extract 
meaning from statutes as accurately as possible (using any interpretive theory, 
whether textualist, purposivist, or otherwise).36 Elliott suggested that agencies 
turned away from this model after Chevron, substituting their own value 
judgments for those of Congress. While we should not overstate the starkness of 
the shift— agencies will generally consider both policy and legal issues in their 
 
30. Textualists, purposivists, and intentionalists debate the extent to which each of these should be 
used as evidence of statutory meaning. However, each of these schools of thought is ultimately interested in 
determining the objective meaning of the statute, rather than in de novo policymaking.  
31. Of course, agencies ordinarily do both to some extent. As described further below in this Section, 
under Chevron, agencies may exercise normative discretion to pick among a range of options within a “Chevron 
space” determined through traditional tools of statutory interpretation. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying 
text. But outside that Chevron space, normal tools of statutory interpretation will still apply. This Article studies 
the balance between legal analysis and policy analysis, recognizing that no agency will ever pursue only one or 
the other. 
32. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 & n.9 (1984).  
33. Id. at 865-66. 
34. Elliott, supra note 12, at 11. 
35. Id. at 12; see also Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 
YALE L.J. 1032, 1046 (2011) (“As compared to the predecessor regime, a major effect of Chevron is to 
disempower lawyers within agencies.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory 
Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 532-33 & nn.71, 73 (2005). The 
dichotomy between lawyers and subject-matter experts becomes blurred at the IRS, where lawyers make both 
policy decisions and legal decisions. However, even at the IRS, there is a distinction between rulemaking on 
policy grounds and on legal grounds. 
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989); 
John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119-20; Jonathan H. Choi, An Empirical Study 
of Statutory Interpretation in Tax Law, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 368 n.15 (2020). 
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rulemaking—Elliott’s view, common among administrative scholars, is that 
Chevron initiated a significant move away from law and toward policy. 
Peter Strauss similarly describes judicial deference as creating a “Chevron 
space.” In his view, readings of the statute that are “permissible” but not 
“necessary” fall within this Chevron space, and agencies may freely select among 
these readings without judicial override.37 This provides agencies the opportunity 
to make rules on policy grounds, if they prefer. In the same vein, other scholars 
have created theoretical models that assume agencies optimize policy goals rather 
than attempting to interpret statutes as accurately as possible.38 
Opponents of Chevron often criticize agencies for replacing congressional 
policy judgments with agencies’ own.39 In contrast, supporters of Chevron often 
celebrate it on the same basis—that agencies can bring field-specific expertise that 
Congress and judges lack, and that considering policy goals in rulemaking will 
help to implement statutes as effectively as possible.40  
But although many claim that Chevron has inspired a shift from legal to 
policy analysis, there are some dissenting voices and substantial reason to doubt 
the extent of Chevron’s influence. Although most would agree that Chevron de-
emphasizes legal analysis of statutes, some would disagree that it elevates 
normative policy analysis instead. Catherine Sharkey argues that because 
Chevron step two conventionally does not require courts to assess the normative 
validity of agency rulemaking, agencies have little incentive to explain themselves 
or to make rules on appropriate policy grounds.41 Within the Chevron space, it 
could be that agencies make rules for less savory reasons (self-interest, political 
expediency) or for no apparent reason. 
 
37. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1163-64 (2013).  
38. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural 
Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 535, 536, 544 
(2006) (assuming that agencies are “interpretive instrumentalists, attaching no intrinsic importance to textual 
fidelity or analogous concerns” but instead attempting to “secure whatever interpretation would best advance 
its substantive policy agenda”); John R. Wright, Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference to Federal 
Agencies, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. 217, 226 (2010) (also modelling agency action as a function of policy goals). 
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (complaining that Chevron empowers agencies “not to find the best meaning of the 
text, but to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on policy judgments made by the agency rather 
than Congress”); Beermann, supra note 6, at 784 (“Chevron encourages irresponsible agency and judicial 
behavior. Agencies expecting that their interpretive decisions will be reviewed under a deferential version of 
Chevron are free to disregard congressional intent and impose their own policy views even when it is possible 
to have at least a good sense of how Congress would have wanted the agency to act.”).  
40. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 
305 (2017) (“When a statute is unclear, and especially when a complex modern regulatory statute is unclear, 
resolution of the ambiguity will inevitably require policy-making competence—which courts lack and which 
agencies have.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 
928-30 (2003) (describing, with approval, an EPA regulation formulated on pragmatic public policy rather than 
purely statutory grounds). 
41. Sharkey, supra note 29, at 2370-73. 
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Those who have described a shift toward normative rulemaking have 
primarily relied on anecdote.42 While empirical literature suggests that both 
congressional drafters and agency administrators are aware of Chevron,43 past 
work has been agnostic regarding Chevron’s actual effect on agency activity. 
Christopher Walker’s 2015 survey of agency rule drafters touches on this question 
but produced mixed results. Walker asked agency administrators whether 
heightened judicial deference would make an agency “more willing to advance a 
more aggressive interpretation.”44 Willingness to advance a more aggressive 
interpretation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agency to shift its 
focus to policy. For example, administrators might adopt an aggressive 
interpretation not to enact ideal policies, but rather to entrench their own power, 
or advance other selfish career goals at the expense of public administration.45 
Walker’s survey results were inconclusive; while two in five administrators agreed 
with this statement, others indicated that:  
 
the judicial deference standard is just one of many factors that affect agency 
statutory interpretation, and it may be a pretty insignificant factor in the large 
scheme. And a couple rule drafters indicated that they had never personally taken 
into account or observed others taking into account the type of deference the agency 
expected to receive.46  
 
Walker concludes that “broader generalizations about whether agencies draft 
more aggressively when they know Chevron applies probably cannot be drawn 
from this study,” suggesting that “the findings uncovered should encourage 
deeper empirical inquiry.”47 
A prior article of mine was one of the earliest efforts to empirically study 
agencies’ relative focus on legal interpretation and policymaking, based on 
regulations themselves.48 It revealed that the IRS became substantially more 
normative and less statutory in the guidance that it issued during the 1980s.49 
 
42. Kavanaugh, supra note 4; Elliott, supra note 12. 
43. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 66 STAN. L. REV. 901, 927 (2013); 
Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1019 (2015). 
44. Walker, supra note 43, at 1063; Christopher J Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An 
Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 723-24 (2014).  
45. Walker’s hypothesis that agency interpretations might be more “aggressive” when judicial 
deference is stronger follows a long line of political science literature that generally models the relationship 
between Congress and agencies as one between principals and agents, each of which is “assumed to have 
different preferences.” RACHEL AUGUSTINE POTTER, BENDING THE RULES: PROCEDURAL POLITICKING IN 
THE BUREAUCRACY 7 (2019) (describing an “external perspective" in the political science literature, “premised 
on a principal-agent framework”). 
46. Christopher J Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 724 (2014). 
47. Id. at 725. 
48. Choi, supra note 36. 
49. Id. at 392-95. 
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However, this study had several features that prevented it from serving as a study 
of the causal effect of Chevron on agency rulemaking. 
First, because it only considered tax regulations, it failed to compare trends 
in IRS guidance with trends at other agencies. Second, because it examined only 
broad trends over time, there was no way to separate the effect of Chevron from 
other important contemporaneous developments that could have affected IRS 
guidance, like the rise of cost-benefit analysis, the appointment of new textualist 
judges, and the popularization of law and economics.50 As a result, this study did 
not test the hypothesis that Chevron itself actually caused a normative shift in the 
1980s. Third, as Section I.D discusses, most Treasury regulations were not thought 
to be subject to Chevron deference at all prior to 2011. So, this prior study not 
only refrained from claims of causal inference regarding the effect of judicial 
deference in general; it also refrained from claims of causal inference relating to 
Chevron deference in particular.51 
Consequently, research discussing Chevron’s effect on the balance between 
normative policymaking and statutory interpretation remains incomplete. While 
Chevron is sometimes believed to permit agencies to make rules based on policy 
considerations rather than legal ones, theoretical accounts are mixed and 
empirical evidence on this question is thin. 
B. Procedural Effort as the Price of Deference 
Another way that Chevron might affect agency rulemaking is by changing 
the amount of effort that agencies exert in complying with rulemaking 
procedures, especially when they explain new regulations and engage with public 
comments.52  
The simplest hypothesis is that Chevron does not matter. The obligations to 
adequately explain rulemaking and address public comments are procedural 
requirements under State Farm53 and section 553(c) of the APA.54 In theory, they 
are independent obligations that would apply equally under Chevron or any other 
deference regime. 
Another view is that Chevron provides a pure benefit—that it is a boon to 
agencies, providing them additional cover to advance their own regulatory 
preferences. On this theory, a shift to Chevron deference might embolden 
agencies to write shorter preambles that engage less with public comments. 
Writing a preamble is time-consuming, and reading voluminous public comments 
 
50. Id. at 393. 
51. Id. at 393-95. 
52. Procedural effort contrasts with what one might call “substantive effort.” The former focuses on 
the procedural aspects of regulations, especially the process of explaining and justifying regulations through 
preambles; the latter would focus on the drafting of regulations themselves. Procedural effort may or may not 
serve as a proxy for rulemaking effort in general.  
53. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
54. Section 553(c) of the APA requires that an agency adopting a rule through notice and comment 
provide a “concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018). 
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and substantively responding to them can be a daunting task for agency 
employees.55 A lengthy and responsive preamble might be necessary if Chevron 
does not apply and courts are likely to scrutinize the rationale behind agency 
rulemaking. But why bother writing long, technical preambles if your regulation 
will be upheld regardless?  
This Article argues the opposite—that we should expect heightened judicial 
deference to increase the amount of effort agencies exert in procedural 
compliance. The Supreme Court has moved in recent decades to strengthen the 
link between procedural rulemaking requirements and Chevron. Most notably, 
the Supreme Court has linked Chevron deference with the notice and comment 
process. The Court said in 2001 that notice and comment is a “very good 
indicator” that a regulation is intended to have the force of law and therefore 
receive Chevron deference.56  
Similarly, the Court ruled in 2016 that “Chevron deference is not warranted 
where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’—that is, where the agency errs by 
failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.”57 It went on to 
say that a regulation can be procedurally defective, forfeiting Chevron deference, 
if the agency fails to “give adequate reasons for its decisions.”58 Courts also 
sometimes merge State Farm analysis with Chevron step two,59 and the Supreme 
Court’s considerable jurisprudence surrounding “Chevron step zero”—the initial 
judicial determination over whether Chevron should apply—has suggested that 
 
55. POTTER, supra note 45, at 33. 
56. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. 
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing Mead). Relatedly, several scholars have proposed that regulations 
should receive Chevron deference if and only if they are issued with notice and comment. This proposal, 
advanced by scholars including Jacob Gersen and John Manning, has been dubbed the “short cut.” See David 
L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 299 
(2010) (coining the term “short cut”); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 
1719 (2007); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 931 (2004).  
 The “short cut” is distinct from the price-of-deference theory in that it is a normative proposal for 
what the law should be rather than a descriptive proposal for how agency incentives actually operate. Moreover, 
the short-cut theory primarily considers whether a regulation should be considered legislative and therefore 
receive Chevron deference. In contrast, the price-of-deference theory assumes that an agency does conduct 
notice and comment and that a given regulation will receive a fixed level of deference (Chevron or National 
Muffler in particular). Given this assumption, it then asks how much effort the agency will exert in the notice 
and comment process. Put differently, the key decision in the short-cut theory is whether or not to engage in 
notice and comment; the key decision in the price-of-deference theory is how much effort to exert in notice and 
comment, assuming that notice and comment occurs. 
57. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 227). 
58. Id. Similarly, the Court ruled in 2015 that “[n]ot only must an agency's decreed result be within the 
scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.  It 
follows that agency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a consideration of the relevant factors.’” Michigan v. EPA, 
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983)). This pair of cases has been taken by some scholars to suggest that the Court is reconsidering its 
Chevron jurisprudence to apply a more searching “hard look” review under Chevron step two. E.g., Sharkey, 
supra note 29, at 2419-29. But the foundation for this move was laid much earlier, at the latest by Mead in 2001. 
59. E.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
1253 (1997). 
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greater deliberation in rulemaking is a factor in applying Chevron.60 Similarly, 
under the Chenery doctrine, courts reviewing agency rulemaking may only 
consider justifications for rules presented by the agencies themselves.61 Each of 
these judicial moves might link Chevron deference with rulemaking procedures 
in the minds of agencies. 
Of course, we should not overinterpret particular phrases from a few key 
cases. The link between Chevron and rulemaking procedures remains ambiguous, 
and Chevron conventionally remains completely separate from State Farm and 
section 553(c) of the APA. Scholars attempting to link Chevron with rulemaking 
procedures generally frame their arguments as a new proposal or a path for future 
Supreme Court doctrine, rather than a claim about established doctrine.62 
This Article therefore advances a more ambitious claim: even assuming that 
Chevron imposes no procedural rulemaking requirements, greater interpretive 
deference through Chevron should result in greater procedural effort. This is 
because agencies will see longer and more responsive preambles as the price of 
deference: agencies should invest more resources into satisfying procedural 
requirements if the payoff is a regulation that will benefit from heightened 
deference. In this way, the price that agencies are willing to pay should increase if 
the deference regime becomes more favorable to them, much as consumers 
should be willing to pay a higher price for more useful goods. 
It may seem counterintuitive that increased judicial deference could 
encourage an agency to spend greater effort to justify its rulemaking. The key 
insight is that under a weaker deference regime, agencies may not find it 
worthwhile to exert much effort obeying rulemaking procedures—procedural 
compliance might become irrelevant if the regulation is rejected on statutory 
interpretation grounds. Regardless, a higher degree of deference removes this 
risk, increasing the payoff from procedural effort. 
To illustrate this point, Section A of the Appendix introduces a theoretical 
model of agency decision-making as a function of the amount of effort exerted in 
rulemaking procedures, the level of judicial deference, and the benefit from 
successfully promulgating a new regulation. The model includes two levels of 
judicial deference, Chevron and “sub-Chevron” (which could stand in for any less 
deferential regime, like Skidmore).63 It is purely theoretical: it is loosely based on 
existing empirical scholarship64 but does not draw on the empirical evidence in 
this Article. 
 
60. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); see also Michael Pollack & Daniel Hemel, Chevron Step 
0.5, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 24, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-step-0-5-by-
michael-pollack-and-daniel-hemel [https://perma.cc/5G2T-EKKW] (discussing Encino Motorcars). 
61. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). While Chenery predated the APA, it has 
subsequently been held to apply to formal agency rulemaking. See, e.g., Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 
116 YALE L.J. 952, 955-56 (2007) (describing the widespread application of Chenery). 
62. E.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 29; Sharkey, supra note 29. 
63. Infra app., eq. 2 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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The model follows the standard view that State Farm and judicial 
interpretations of section 553(c) of the APA dictate agencies’ obligation to 
explain rules and respond to comments, whereas judicial deference asks whether 
a regulation is substantively permissible in light of the statute. Consequently, the 
model takes the probability that a regulation will be upheld on judicial deference 
grounds as given (because it depends on factors outside the model) and treats the 
probability of compliance with State Farm and section 553(c) as a function of 
effort in explaining rules and responding to public comments. The overall 
probability that a regulation will be upheld is simply the product of these two 
probabilities. 
Note that this model is agnostic about agency motivations. Agencies might 
desire good governance; or pursue self-interest (for example, they might aim to 
avoid the embarrassment of having regulations overturned); or view rulemaking 
as performative; or some combination of the three. The model merely assumes 
that agencies prefer for their regulations to be upheld.  
The model has several features that mimic current regulatory practice. First, 
the probabilities have a minimum value above zero, reflecting a baseline 
likelihood that any particular regulation will be upheld, even with minimal agency 
effort. Second, the probability that rulemaking will be upheld under State Farm 
smoothly increases as a function of effort (in mathematical terms, it 
monotonically increases). Third, there are decreasing returns to additional 
procedural effort (in mathematical terms, the probability function is concave), so 
that the likelihood a regulation is upheld is ultimately bounded by a maximum 
likelihood depending on the deference regime (80% for Chevron, 50% for sub-
Chevron).65 Fourth, the likelihood that a regulation will be upheld is always higher 
where Chevron applies than under the less deferential regime. The model does 
not assume that Chevron is less deferential than the alternative at any point on 
the curve. Agencies might prefer to exert more effort even though, and indeed 
precisely because, Chevron is always more deferential at any given level of effort.  
Given these probability functions, we can model agency action as an attempt 
to maximize utility as a function of procedural effort. Effort is directly costly, 
lowering utility; however, it also increases utility by increasing the likelihood that 
a regulation will be upheld.66 Within this model, heightened judicial deference 
increases the optimal amount of effort that an agency exerts in rulemaking. 
Section A of the Appendix includes more formal mathematical discussion and a 
proof of this result. The proof depends on a limited set of assumptions, primarily 
monotonicity and concavity, and any probability function with these properties 
will satisfy the proof. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the probability that a 
 
65. These percentages are loosely based on empirical findings by Kent Barnett and Chris Walker that 
agencies prevailed 77.4% of the time under Chevron and 56% of the time under Skidmore within their sample 
of cases. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017). 
Because regulations challenged in court are likely the ones with the lowest probability of being upheld, the true 
percentage likelihood of prevailing is probably higher across the entire population of issued regulations. 
66. See infra app., eq. 1 and accompanying text.  
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regulation will be upheld as a logistic function, and Figure 2 illustrates expected 
utility as a function of procedural effort, again using the logistic function. But any 
other concave, monotonically increasing function could also be used. 
 




Figure 2: Expected Utility as a Function of Procedural Effort 
 
 
The theory that procedural effort serves as the price of deference therefore 
operates along two potential paths. First, as the model suggests, even if judicial 
deference and rulemaking procedures are completely separate as a theoretical 
matter, agencies have an incentive to increase their procedural effort if judicial 
deference increases. Second, we should expect that this relationship has grown 
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even stronger in recent years, as the Supreme Court has gestured at a more 
explicit link between rulemaking procedures and Chevron.67 
Although regulatory procedures might seem secondary to the substantive 
content of regulations, procedures play an important role in the modern 
regulatory state. Oceans of scholarly ink have been spilled discussing the benefits 
of notice and comment: it facilitates public engagement and makes agencies 
democratically accountable, which scholars frequently cite as the primary 
justification for judicial deference to agency interpretation.68 Public comments 
provide agencies with additional information and more diverse viewpoints, 
bolster agency legitimacy, and encourage agencies to engage in more deliberative 
policy analysis prior to issuing regulations.69 The explanations that agencies offer 
in the rulemaking process are also themselves important interpretive references 
for lawyers and judges.70  
On the other hand, procedural effort has downsides as well. It is time-
consuming and may not be an optimal use of agency resources. A considerable 
political science literature has debated whether procedural requirements like 
notice and comment ossify agency rulemaking by making it prohibitively 
expensive to repeal or amend existing regulations, or to propose new 
regulations.71 If judicial deference encourages agencies to spend even more time 
and resources on procedural aspects of rulemaking, it could potentially lead to 
even more ossification. Some scholars have also suggested that notice and 
comment may be a tool for agency capture because its participants are 
disproportionately powerful interest groups with access to high-priced lawyers.72 
Still others have argued that regulatory preambles have become excessively long, 
 
67. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
68. E.g., Metzger, supra note 15, at 130 (describing the belief that notice and comment enhances 
political accountability of agencies as an “obsession” among administrative law scholars); see also Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007) (describing 
some scholars’ belief that “administrative procedures may help to ensure that agencies stay more or less in line 
with legislative preferences”). 
69. E.g., Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 15, at 968-69 (“In administrative law, the notice-and-
comment process serves several related functions: providing information to decisionmakers, legitimating the 
decisionmaking process, and constraining decisionmakers by pushing them to confront arguments that point 
away from their preferred course of action.”). 
70. Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 361 (2012) (“[T]he text of a 
regulation and its statement of basis and purpose [preamble] stand in a unique relationship: together, they 
constitute the act of regulation, an act that is not complete without either element of this couplet. Based on this 
premise, it does not make sense to interpret the text of a regulation independently from its statement of basis 
and purpose.”); Kevin M Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1252, 1252 (2016) (describing 
preambles as “the most authoritative source of guidance about the meaning of agency regulations”); see also 
Sharkey, supra note 29, at 2365 (describing how preambles serve as the basis for judicial oversight of 
regulations). 
71. E.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic 
Rulemaking: Is Federal Rule-Making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261 (2010). 
72. Clinton G. Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L. REV. 179, 182 (2017) 
(finding, after reviewing a sample of tax regulations, that participation in notice and comment is “heavily 
weighted towards private interests”). 
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making them difficult to read and therefore less useful to lawyers and the general 
public.73 
Ultimately, as with the balance between statutory and normative analyses of 
rulemaking, opinions differ on the ideal amount of procedural effort that agencies 
should exert. But it is notable that prior literature has been so sparse on the link 
between judicial deference and rulemaking procedures. This Article introduces a 
new theoretical account within which such a link could plausibly exist, where more 
deference encourages more procedural effort.  
Of course, this is purely a theoretical model, and heavily dependent on 
specific modelling choices.74 In reality, judicial deference might have little or no 
effect on procedural effort, and the incentives described by the model could be 
counterbalanced by other considerations that the model does not address. Only 
empirical investigation can confirm whether heightened judicial deference 
actually encourages agencies to exert greater procedural effort. 
C. Does Chevron Matter? 
Empirical studies of Chevron’s effect on courts have often argued that 
Chevron’s influence is overstated, that courts invoke Chevron less often than is 
commonly assumed,75 and that Chevron is rarely outcome determinative even 
when invoked.76 This literature gives some reason to doubt that agencies really 
 
73. E.g., Alec Webley, Seeing Through a Preamble, Darkly: Administrative Verbosity in an Age of 
Populism and “Fake News,” 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) (“[T]he public truth-telling function of these 
‘preambles’ has become undermined by their spectacular length, often to more than a thousand pages longer 
than their parent rules, making it virtually impossible for anyone (even lawyers!) to properly read them.”). On 
the other hand, preambles to tax regulations have historically erred on the side of brevity, nothing near the 
thousand-page preambles of other agencies.  
74. See infra Appendix Section A. 
75. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment 
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1125 (2008) (“[T]he Court 
does not apply the Chevron framework in nearly three-quarters of the cases where it would appear applicable.”). 
But see Natalie Salmanowitz & Holger Spamann, Does the Supreme Court Really Not Apply Chevron When 
It Should?, 57 INT. REV. LAW ECON. 81, 81 (2019) (“Our reexamination of [Eskridge and Baer’s] study finds 
that the fraction of such cases is far lower, and indeed closer to zero.”).  
76. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 93 (2011) (“There is no empirical support for the widespread belief that choice of doctrine 
plays a major role in judicial review of agency actions.”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 
135, 135 (2010) (“[T]he variance of the validation rates of agency action, regardless of the standard of review, is 
small.”); Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of 
Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 231, 271-72 (2008) (“Chevron has become the argument for the losing 
side, with failure by the majority to adhere to a straightforward Chevron analysis emerging as a recurring 
criticism in dissenting opinions.”); Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the 
Administrative State, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (“Notwithstanding overheated charges, there is little reason 
to think that applying Chevron, as opposed to a supposedly tighter standard of review, such as Skidmore 
deference, is frequently outcome determinative in significant cases.”); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 75, at 1142 
(finding that the Supreme Court affirmed agency rulemaking at very similar rates whether applying Chevron or 
Skidmore). But see Barnett & Walker, supra note 65, at 6 (finding that different forms of judicial deference 
result in substantially different rates of affirmation at circuit courts); Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & 
Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1468 (2018) (“We 
find that Chevron deference significantly curbs (but does not fully constrain) judicial discretion.”). 
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alter their rulemaking practices in response to Chevron, if administrators believe 
that Chevron is ineffective (either based on their own observations or based on 
the empirical literature). 
Separately, scholars and judges have provided additional theoretical reasons 
to doubt that Chevron’s imposition (or, conversely, its abolition) really changes 
the applicable level of judicial deference. Certain judges, including Justice Breyer 
and former Judge Posner, have suggested that Chevron is not in fact much more 
deferential than the standard one step down, Skidmore77 deference.78 And some 
scholars and courts have merged Chevron’s “reasonableness” standard79 with the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard that preceded it under the APA.80 While 
Chevron remains frequently discussed and highly influential in spite of these 
critiques, they provide some reason to doubt that Chevron had the impact 
suggested by thinkers like Elliott81 or by the price-of-deference model. 
Thus, a significant gap remains in the empirical literature on the effects of 
Chevron. Many theorists believe that Chevron encourages agencies to focus on 
policy issues rather than legal ones; but others disagree, and empirical evidence is 
limited on this point. I propose in this Article that Chevron encourages agencies 
to increase efforts in procedural aspects of rulemaking, but this new theory cuts 
against conventional wisdom and has not yet been tested. And, contrary to these 
 
A related but separate line of scholarship considers the frequency of litigation challenges to agency rulemaking. 
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Litigating EPA Rules: A Fifty-Year Retrospective of 
Environmental Rulemaking in the Courts, 70 CASE W. L. REV. 1007 (2020) (empirically studying the rates at 
which EPA regulations were challenged in court and the frequency of success in these lawsuits). 
77. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding subregulatory guidance, “while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do[es] constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”). Courts have long held that agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes might be “entitled to very great respect.” Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827); see also Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (holding 
that contemporaneous construction of an administering agency was “entitled to respectful consideration”); 
Swendig v. Wash. Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322, 331 (1924) (same). 
78. Murphy, supra note 76, at 41-42. 
79. E.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (“[U]nder Chevron step two, we ask whether 
an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”); Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 76 F.3d 
1234, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he second step of Chevron . . . overlaps with the arbitrary and capricious 
standard”); Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives 
the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 710 (2007) (describing how certain 
scholars have argued that “arbitrary and capricious” is the appropriate standard for reasonableness under 
Chevron step two, and citing recent decisions by lower federal courts and the Supreme Court embracing this 
view); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 
(1997) (arguing that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard and reasonableness under Chevron “should be 
deemed not just overlapping, but identical”). 
80. Foote, supra note 79, at 675 (“Before Chevron, courts tended to use the statutory standard of 
arbitrary and capricious review and its close kin, the substantial evidence test, for oversight of most agency 
‘carrying out’ actions—that is, for review of quintessential administrative implementation of statutory 
programs.”). 
81. Of course, it is possible that Chevron had an effect on agencies but not on courts, if agencies 
reformed their rulemaking mistakenly expecting to receive heightened judicial deference. Beermann, supra note 
6, at 783 n.9. But this argument requires an additional inferential step and seems less plausible than Chevron 
directly awarding more deference to agency determinations. 
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theoretical predictions, much of the existing literature on Chevron’s application 
by courts suggests that it may not matter at all.  
D. National Muffler and Interpretative Tax Regulations 
Administrative tax law presents a unique opportunity to measure the effects 
of a change in deference regime. Prior to 2011, the Treasury Department had long 
distinguished between “legislative” and “interpretative” regulations.82 
Ostensibly, legislative regulations were those for which Congress delegated 
specific rulemaking authority to the IRS—for example, the grant in 26 U.S.C. § 
1502 for the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe such regulations as he may 
deem necessary” to tax consolidated corporate groups. In contrast, interpretative 
rules did not require a specific act of rulemaking authority, but rather relied on 
the general instruction in 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) that the Secretary “prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of” the entire tax code.83  
The distinction in tax law between legislative rules based on specific 
congressional authorization and interpretative rules based only on general 
congressional authorization predated both the APA and Chevron.84 Importantly, 
it differed from the mainstream definition of “interpretative” rules in 
administrative law, which defines regulations as legislative if they “carry the force 
of law.”85 As Kristin Hickman argued prior to 2011, virtually all Treasury 
regulations (both interpretative and legislative) carried the force of law even prior 
to Mayo. Moreover, Treasury conducted notice and comment for virtually all 
Treasury regulations (both interpretative and legislative) both before and after 
Mayo,86 another hallmark that a regulation is “legislative” in general 
 
82. The terminology derives from the APA, which exempts “interpretative rules” from notice and 
comment requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018). Interpretative rules are sometimes also known as 
“interpretive” rules.  
83. See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 
63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1673 (2014) (describing “the long-held view of the Department of Treasury that tax 
regulations issued under the general grant of authority in I.R.C. § 7805(a) are interpretative regulations within 
the meaning of the APA”); ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX 
LAW. 717, 728 (2004) (“Interpretive regulations are those promulgated under the general authority of section 
7805(a)”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original 
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 571-75 (2002). 
84. Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 643, 654-59 (2012). This distinction was unique to tax law. Id. at 656 (“Prior to the APA, there was 
an understanding specific to tax law that general-authority regulations were interpretative and that specific-
authority regulations were legislative.”). 
85. Ostensibly, a regulation that carries the force of law is legislative and therefore must satisfy notice 
and comment procedures. Whether a regulation receives Chevron deference also depends on whether it carries 
the force of law; but, confusingly, “it is not at all clear whether the force of law occupies precisely the same 
conceptual space” in these two different contexts. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. 
L. REV. 465, 467 (2013).  
86. In an empirical study analyzing Treasury regulations promulgated between 2003 and 2005, 
Hickman found that among 137 tax regulations that cited general authority only (i.e., interpretative tax 
regulations), only 10 were promulgated without notice and comment, and at least half of the 10 claimed a good 
cause exception to notice and comment requirements. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: 
Examining Treasury’s (Lack Of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 
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administrative law parlance.87 Nonetheless, because my empirical methods rely 
on the pre-2011, tax exceptionalist88 classification of some tax regulations as 
interpretative and some as legislative, this Article generally uses “interpretative” 
and “legislative” in that sense.  
The interpretative/legislative distinction in tax law was not merely academic. 
For many years prior to Mayo, conventional wisdom also held that interpretative 
tax regulations would not receive full Chevron deference. Instead, they would 
receive less-deferential review under National Muffler, a case that pre-dated 
Chevron by five years. National Muffler addressed an interpretative regulation 
that the IRS promulgated using its general interpretive authority under section 
7805(a) of the Code. The Supreme Court concluded that the regulation would 
warrant deference if it “implemented the congressional mandate in some 
reasonable manner.”89 Reasonableness, in turn, was determined by a number of 
specific factors, including: 
 
whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, 
and its purpose, [whether the regulation was a] substantially contemporaneous 
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional 
intent, . . . the manner in which it evolved, . . . the length of time the regulation has 
been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner’s 
interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation 
during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.90 
 
National Muffler’s factors emphasize statutory interpretation, making it directly 
comparable both to forms of judicial deference predating Chevron and potential 
replacements for Chevron. Judicial deference in the early twentieth century, as 
ultimately codified by the APA, simply awarded special weight to agencies’ 
contemporaneous construction of statutes and subsequent customary interpretive 
practices.91 These are the exact factors discussed in National Muffler. Moreover, 
many have suggested that the Court ought to return to a framework that 
 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1751-53 (2007); see also infra notes 212-213 (discussing Hickman’s findings in 
more detail). 
 Although the IRS ultimately conducts notice and comment for almost all tax regulations, sometimes 
they are first promulgated as temporary regulations prior to notice and comment. Infra Appendix Section D. 
87. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
88. Cf. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006) (criticizing the tendency to treat tax regulations differently from other 
regulations). After Mayo, the IRS has tweaked its definitions of legislative and interpretative regulations to 
match other areas of law more closely, as reflected in the 2018 revision to its internal reference manual for 
employees. I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 2.1.1.2.8 (Aug. 2, 2018).  
89. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979) (quoting United States v. 
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973)). 
90. Nat’l Muffler, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). 
91. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 
916 (2017). 
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prioritizes statutory interpretation,92 making National Muffler a natural case 
study for the effect of replacing Chevron. 
Because National Muffler’s factors are so specific, it was thought to be less 
deferential than Chevron, which set out a relatively vague standard for 
reasonableness. And because the facts in National Muffler concerned an 
interpretative regulation, most tax lawyers and judges believed that interpretative 
tax regulations continued to be subject merely to National Muffler deference, 
even after Chevron.93 In contrast, legislative tax regulations were thought to 
receive full Chevron deference. The distinction mattered because interpretative 
tax regulations were, and remain, extremely common. A significant majority of 
tax regulations are interpretative in the sense in which tax lawyers used that 
term—during the period studied by this Article, 74.1% of all tax regulations cited 
section 7805 as their sole source of authority (meaning that they were 
interpretative), and only 0.014% of tax regulations cited some other section of the 
Code as their sole source of authority (meaning that they were legislative).94 And 
regulations in general play an important role in tax law, especially since tax 
statutes are often written at a high level of generality that leaves substantial space 
for regulatory implementation. 
In the decade before Mayo, the state of deference for interpretative tax 
regulations had become increasingly unclear.95 Circuit courts had split on whether 
these regulations would receive full Chevron deference,96 lesser National Muffler 
deference,97 or some blurred combination of the two (sometimes on the basis that 
Chevron deference and National Muffler deference were indistinguishable98). But 
the prevailing view was that interpretative tax regulations were subject to 
National Muffler deference rather than Chevron, and that National Muffler 
deference was indeed weaker.99 As a result, the IRS would have expected that it 
 
92. E.g., Murphy, supra note 76, at 3 (“[C]ourts reviewing agency statutory constructions should, 
contra Chevron, pick the constructions they deem best.”). 
93. Hickman, supra note 88, at 1557 (“Although the practical difference is not always apparent, in 
[jurisdictions that accorded some Treasury regulations only National Muffler deference, rather than Chevron 
deference], specific authority regulations are given ‘controlling weight’ pursuant to Chevron while general 
authority regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a) are given only ‘considerable weight’ under National 
Muffler.”). As Hickman has pointed out, this reasoning was hard to justify given that Chevron itself dealt with 
a regulation promulgated under the EPA’s general authority under the Clean Air Act, analogous to section 
7805(a) of the Code. Hickman, supra note 86, at 1763-64. 
94. Infra Appendix Section D. 
95. Hickman, supra note 88, at 1556-59. 
96. Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 348 F.3d 136, 140-41 (6th Cir. 2003); Swallows 
Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). 
97. Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); Schuler Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d 
753, 754-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
98. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006), rev’d, 515 F.3d 162; Hickman, supra note 
88, at 1557-58. 
99. E.g., Joana Que, The State of Treasury Regulatory Authority After Mayo Foundation: Arguing 
for an Intentionalist Approach at Chevron Step One, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1413-14 (2012) (noting that 
“[b]efore Mayo, Chevron did not have very much influence in the tax world,” and describing National Muffler 
as “a less deferential, tax-specific standard of review”). 
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would have to defend its interpretative regulations, at least in some courts, under 
National Muffler criteria.100 
The Supreme Court resolved this split in Mayo. Mayo concerned a regulation 
promulgated solely under the IRS’s general section 7805 authority, and therefore 
was a clear example of an interpretative tax regulation.101 The taxpayer argued 
that the regulation should be given only National Muffler deference, rather than 
Chevron deference. But the Court disagreed. Justice Roberts, writing for a 
unanimous Court, failed to find “any justification for applying a less deferential 
standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules 
of any other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to 
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”102 He 
concluded that “Chevron and Mead, rather than National Muffler and Rowan, 
provide the appropriate framework” for evaluating interpretative tax 
regulations.103  
In other words, Mayo abolished the old, tax-specific distinction between 
interpretative and legislative regulations, at least for deference purposes. After 
Mayo, general administrative law standards applied to treat tax regulations as 
uniformly legislative, and therefore uniformly entitled to Chevron deference. By 
establishing that Chevron was the appropriate deference standard for 
interpretative tax regulations, the Supreme Court brought deference standards 
for these regulations back in line with those for regulations issued by other 
agencies. In doing so, it provided a unique opportunity for an empirical study on 
the impact of Chevron deference.  
II. Data and Methods 
A. Quantifying Text 
Empirical scholars studying legal texts have traditionally read and coded 
individual documents: for example, by subjectively categorizing regulations based 
on their content.104 But better datasets, faster computers, and modern techniques 
for text analysis have increasingly made it possible to use algorithmic natural 
language processing in place of human readers. Rather than holistic, subjective 
 
100. Moreover, even prior to Mayo, some scholars had criticized the distinction between interpretative 
and legislative as fictive. Most prominently, Kristin Hickman argued that tax scholars and practitioners were 
indulging in “tax exceptionalism” when they attempted to carve out special categories of regulations solely 
within tax law. See Hickman, supra note 88. Instead, Hickman has argued (both before and after Mayo) that no 
Treasury regulations are truly interpretative within the meaning of the APA. See Hickman, supra note 86, at 
1761-73. Hickman sparked a substantial scholarly re-evaluation of administrative tax law in the mid-2000s, by 
arguing that all tax regulations should receive Chevron deference. Hickman, supra note 88. 
101. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. Comm’r, 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011). 
102. Id. at 55. 
103. Id. at 57. 
104. Frank Fagan, Book Review, Natural Language Processing for Lawyers and Judges, 118 MICH. L. 
REV. *13 (2021) (forthcoming) (“Older descriptive studies of legal doctrine that populate law reviews and 
treatises rely on hand-coded cases and small datasets.”). 
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assessments, articles like this one quantify texts based on the specific words that 
they use.105  
For example, this Article uses terms like “fairness” and “efficiency” as a 
proxy for an agency’s normative orientation in promulgating rules. It then 
calculates the term frequency of these normative phrases by dividing the number 
of such phrases by the total word count of a particular text. A document with one 
hundred words and five normative terms would therefore have a normative term 
frequency of five percent. The Article similarly calculates the frequency of 
statutory terms by counting phrases like the “interpretation” of a “statute;” it 
calculates references to legislative history by counting references to legislative 
materials, like congressional reports and hearings; and it calculates references to 
public comments by counting references to “commenters.” Each set of proxies 
includes an extensive list of synonyms and ignores capitalization, punctuation, and 
stemming (word suffices like “-ly” or “-ing”). Section C of the Appendix describes 
the proxies in greater detail. 
Some existing work on statutory interpretation by courts does not examine 
term frequency, but instead merely calculates the raw percentage of documents 
that have included particular terms—say, the percentage of appellate court cases 
each year citing legislative history—because this is all that has been feasible using 
Westlaw or Lexis searches.106 Term frequency captures this nuance and more. The 
regression analysis in this Article asks not only of how many regulatory preambles 
cite certain concepts at all, but also how frequently preambles refer to those 
concepts when they do cite them.  
In addition, using term frequency rather than a raw percentage of documents 
accounts for changes in the lengths of documents over time.107 Hypothetically, if 
the IRS were to use one normative term every 100 words, then any increase in the 
length of preambles over time would increase the likelihood that any particular 
preamble contained a normative term. This would increase the percentage of 
preambles containing normative terms, but it would not increase term 
frequency.108 
 
105. A great deal of prior work has used either the count of relevant terms or their frequency as a 
methodological proxy. Choi, supra note 36; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of 
the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1 (2018); 
Corey Ditslear & James J. Brudney, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme 
Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009); Steven A. Dean & Lawrence 
M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879 (2007); John 
Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 
YALE L.J. 484 (2014). 
106. Bruhl, supra note 105, at 30 (“[T]he analyses in this Article rely on electronic searches, primarily 
in Westlaw, to identify and count cases.”); Lawrence Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role 
of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 453, 453-54 nn.118-19 (2005) (using Lexis searches 
to assess methodology). 
107. Rachel Potter argues that agencies will tend to promulgate longer preambles when they expect 
pushback from the President, Congress, or courts. POTTER, supra note 45, at 97.  
108. Note, however, that term frequency would not account for a nonlinear relationship between word 
count and term usage. For example, imagine that the first 1000 words of any given preamble do not include any 
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Term frequency also offers some advantages compared to more traditional 
hand-coding methods. It is less reliant on subjective reviewer evaluations and is 
therefore less prone to human error or intercoder unreliability.109 And, because 
term frequency can be efficiently calculated by a computer, it allows studies to 
deal with large datasets of tens of thousands of texts (like the one used in this 
Article) that would be impracticable even for a dedicated team of human readers. 
Finally, it is more transparent and easier to replicate, because the judgments when 
calculating term frequency are primarily in the selection of terms rather than 
sophisticated and subjective evaluation of individual texts. All of the code used in 
this Article, in Python, Stata, and R, and the datasets generated for this Article, 
are publicly available online.110 
Of course, term frequency has disadvantages as well. Most prominently, it is 
generally less nuanced in its evaluation of texts. “Fairness,” “efficiency,” and 
other terms used as proxies do not perfectly capture the qualitative nuances of 
any given agency’s explanation for its decision-making. As a result, term 
frequency can only capture broad changes that are perceptible across many 
different texts. Term frequency is also susceptible to changes in terminology—if 
(purely hypothetically) issues described in terms of “justice” fifty years ago were 
described in terms of “fairness” today, a simple analysis of the term “fairness” 
might suggest a change in attitude where none occurred. Finally, term frequency 
requires large bodies of high-quality data to be effective.  
This Article attempts to mitigate these issues by focusing on high-level shifts 
in terminology, rather than more specific justifications for agency rulemaking. It 
also uses a relatively narrow 20-year snapshot in a time period for which high-
quality official bulk data are publicly available, which lessens the risk of 
terminological change over time and quality issues in text analysis. 
 
normative terms, but the next 1000 include many. If the IRS were to move from 1000-word preambles to 2000-
word preambles, term frequency would still increase.  
However, this hypothetical problem would be hard to square with the results in this Article, where normative 
terms and statutory terms move in opposite directions. That is, if normative terms increased solely as a 
mechanical function of word count increases, why did statutory terms decrease over the same period? Or, if 
statutory terms decreased solely as a mechanical function of word count decreases, why did normative terms 
increase over the same period? 
109. Intercoder reliability refers to the likelihood that different coders will give the same score to the 
same document. It is especially important since in most studies only one coder will read each document, and 
several coders will typically be required to code a full dataset. See generally Matthew Lombard, Jennifer Snyder-
Duch & Cheryl Campanella Bracken, Content Analysis in Mass Communication: Assessment and Reporting 
of Intercoder Reliability, 28 HUM. COMM. RES. 587 (2002) (discussing the concept of intercoder reliability). 
110. Code – How Did Chevron Affect Agency Rulemaking? An Empirical Study, JONATHAN H. 
CHOI, jonathanhchoi.com/code-mayo-chevron (last updated Aug. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/PE8W-4CNR]. 
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B. Preambles as Windows into the Regulatory Process 
The APA requires any agency issuing a new regulation to also write a 
“statement of basis and purpose,” informally known as a preamble.111 The 
preamble explains the agency’s rationale for the regulation and provides 
important guidance on how the regulation will apply. In addition, the preamble 
responds to any suggestions received in notice and comment. This Article studies 
the text of regulatory preambles in order to assess changes in rulemaking style. 
The obvious alternative would be to study the text of regulations themselves. 
However, regulatory text does not reveal whether an agency enacted a regulation 
for policy reasons or legal reasons, nor whether the regulation adopted, rebutted, 
or ignored public comments. Instead, regulatory text is primarily driven by the 
substantive subject matter that the agency wishes to address. Thus, preambles are 
a much more useful tool in considering shifts in agency attitudes toward 
rulemaking. 
A certain kind of legal realist might argue that preambles do not accurately 
reflect agency priorities in drafting regulations. Agencies might, for example, 
determine policies totally independently from promises of judicial deference, and 
merely write preambles ex post using language selected to maximize the 
likelihood of receiving judicial deference. Under this theory, changes in deference 
regime would change the terms used in regulatory preambles, without changing 
the regulations themselves. If so, then preambles would be an inadequate 
substitute for regulations themselves, which are the real object of our interest. 
This is a fair and fundamental critique of the methods in this Article. It 
parallels criticisms of empirical analysis of judicial opinions, which sometimes also 
posit that judges write opinions as post hoc rationalizations. On the other hand, 
regulatory preambles are an important part of the regulatory process—they must 
be adequately detailed in order for the regulation to be upheld112 and are an 
important factor in judicial review of regulations.113 Moreover, they are frequently 
used as guides to the appropriate interpretation of regulations,114 so (like judicial 
opinions) they carry force even if they do not always tell a complete story.  
First-person accounts from agency administrators agree that preambles 
reflect (at least partly) the regulatory process as it actually occurs.115 Ultimately, 
regulatory preambles are the best evidence that we have of the intentions of 
 
111. The name derives from the requirement under the APA that any agency promulgating 
regulations issue “a concise statement of their basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018). 
112. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Stack, supra note 
70, at 377 (“In general, the failure to issue an adequate statement of basis and purpose renders the agency’s 
action invalid.” (citing Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1982))). 
113. Stack, supra note 70, at 378-79. 
114. Id. at 361 (“[T]he text of a regulation and its statement of basis and purpose [preamble] stand in 
a unique relationship: together, they constitute the act of regulation, an act that is not complete without either 
element of this couplet. Based on this premise, it does not make sense to interpret the text of a regulation 
independently from its statement of basis and purpose.”); Stack, supra note 70, at 1252 (describing preambles 
as “the most authoritative source of guidance about the meaning of agency regulations”). 
115. Elliott, supra note 12, at 11. 
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regulators and their thought processes in promulgating regulations. Although this 
evidence is imperfect, it should be considered alongside other evidence in trying 
to form a complete picture of agency practice. 
C. Difference in Differences 
As noted above, the primary obstacle to any causal inference regarding the 
effect of Chevron is the difficulty of identifying treatment and control groups. 
Chevron theoretically applied across administrative law when it was decided in 
1984.116 So, even if Chevron coincided with shifts in agency rulemaking styles, it 
would have been difficult to identify whether this was due to Chevron or to other 
contemporaneous events.  
The primary contribution of this Article is to exploit a unique treatment and 
control group in order to test the effect of Chevron deference—interpretative tax 
regulations. Because Mayo was an unexpected event that altered the IRS’s 
rulemaking incentives, it can serve as the basis for a difference-in-differences 
study.117 
A difference-in-differences model can be used to study the effect of any 
unexpected event that differentially affects a treatment and control group. Figure 
3 below illustrates the basic difference-in-differences model, using interpretative 
tax regulations as the treatment group (solid line) and all other regulations as the 
control group (dotted line). The y-axis illustrates the variable of interest (say, 
frequency of the relevant term), and the x-axis specifies two periods, before and 
after Mayo. If Chevron deference has no effect, then there should be no difference 
between the dashed line and the solid line. A difference-in-differences model 




116. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
117. Phrased more technically, difference-in-differences analysis assumes that “in the pre-treatment 
the treatment had no effect on the pre-treatment population.” Michael Lechner, The Estimation of Causal 
Effects by Difference-in-Difference Methods, 4 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN ECONOMETRICS 165, 178 (2010). 
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Figure 3: Hypothetical Difference-in-Differences Model 
 
 
More technically, the model accounts for differences over time that apply 
both to the treatment and control groups (Δ1 in Figure 3), as well as static 
differences between the treatment and control group (Δ2 in Figure 3). It then 
attempts to identify any disproportionate effect of the unexpected event on the 
treatment group—the treatment effect, or “difference in differences.”  
By focusing on the difference in differences, the model controls for pre-
existing differences between the treatment and control groups, as well as static 
trends. Hypothetically, imagine that courts generally deferred more to tax 
regulations than other regulations as a matter of course, regardless of the 
applicable deference regime. It would consequently be misleading merely to 
compare the levels of normative or statutory term frequencies at any single point 
in time (either before or after Mayo), because courts might be more deferential 
to tax regulations during both periods. Similarly, imagine that pressure from 
different presidential administrations had gradually pushed all agencies to justify 
rulemaking in more normative terms. It would therefore be misleading solely to 
compare interpretative tax regulations before and after Mayo, because the shift 
in the style of interpretative tax regulations might be true of all regulations. By 
instead focusing on the differences in trends between the treatment and control 
groups, this method controls for level differences between the groups that persist 
over time, as well as time trends that apply to all regulations. 
If critics of Chevron like Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh,118 as well as 
supporters of Chevron like Cass Sunstein,119 are correct, then the treatment effect 
should be positive for normative terms and negative for statutory terms, reflecting 
a shift toward normative and away from statutory explanations for rulemaking. 
Similarly, if my model predicting a link between heightened deference and 
 
118. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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procedural effort is correct, then the treatment effect should be positive for 
proxies of procedural effort (the length of regulatory preambles and the 
frequency of references to commenters). If skeptics of Chevron’s influence are 
correct, then the treatment effect in both cases should be small or zero. 
Difference in differences is a useful tool in causal inference, but it makes 
some significant assumptions as well, most prominently the assumption that the 
trends between the treatment and control groups would have remained parallel 
absent the treatment. It is impossible counterfactually to observe what would 
have occurred in the absence of the treatment (Mayo). However, Sections IV.F 
through IV.H apply several statistical techniques to assess the validity of the 
parallel trend assumption and explore alternative models in case the assumption 
is violated. 
Beyond the basic example in Figure 3, additional control variables make the 
model more nuanced and accurate—for example, by adding time trends before 
and after Mayo in order to model changes year-over-year, rather than two blunt 
pre-Mayo and post-Mayo categories. The full model controls for linear time 
trends, separately estimated pre- and post-Mayo; it also controls for the type of 
regulatory document (rule, amendment, notice, or other), the length of the 
relevant regulation’s text,120 the reading level of the preamble,121 and the party of 
the president in power when the regulation was promulgated. Controlling for the 
type of regulatory document and the length of the associated regulation addresses 
bias from changes in the types of regulations issued over time, as well as 
complexity or length of underlying regulations; controlling for reading level 
addresses bias from changes in the overall complexity of preambles over time, 
which could potentially be correlated with interpretive methodology; and 
controlling for party of the current presidential administration addresses bias 
from shifts in regime and possible concomitant shifts in administrative priorities. 
 An additional nuance is that this Article uses a two-part regression model 
to analyze specific terms, meaning that it separately estimates the likelihood that 
a preamble will use any terms of a particular type (step one) and, conditional on 
using at least one term of that type, the quantity of terms used (step two).122  
The two-part model is used in order to more accurately model distributional 
features of the term frequency data, and the two steps are ultimately combined to 
produce estimates of average linear marginal effects, much like a conventional 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.123 However, the two-step regression also 
has the benefit of more granularly modeling the effect of Chevron. For example, 
 
120. Note that the regressions do not control for the length of the preamble, which is already used to 
calculate term frequency. 
121. Reading level is measured using the Coleman-Liau readability index, which uses the average 
number of letters per word and the average number of words per sentence to approximate the grade level that 
would be appropriate for a given text. Meri Coleman & T.L. Liau, A Computer Readability Formula Designed 
for Machine Scoring, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 283 (1975). 
122. See infra Appendix Section G. 
123. See infra Appendix Section G. 
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if a difference-in-differences coefficient were positive in the first step of the two-
part regression, but zero in the second step, that would imply that Chevron makes 
an agency more likely to use any instances of that term, but does not affect the 
intensity of that term’s usage.  
D. Potential Confounders 
A key assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that the 
treatment is the only event that differentially affects the treatment and control 
groups during the relevant period. This is a qualitative question of study design 
rather than a quantitative statistical question. To answer it, we need to consider 
other events in administrative tax law between 2000 and 2020, particularly those 
occurring around Mayo in 2011.  
Mayo was a rare example of a Supreme Court tax case and marked a seismic 
shift in administrative tax law. Moreover, it was a surprise to many tax lawyers 
and scholars when it was decided,124 making it a good candidate as a treatment in 
a difference-in-differences study. However, other court decisions and scholarly 
commentary over the past two decades could also have affected Treasury’s 
regulatory drafting practices. 
First, prior to Mayo, the lines between Chevron and National Muffler 
deference were not as crisp as one might like. The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision 
in Mead provided an early indication that Chevron might be the appropriate 
deference standard for interpretative tax regulations.125 Similarly, scholars have 
argued against tax exceptionalism both before and after Mayo.126 This could have 
caused the IRS to begin anticipating heightened deference even prior to Mayo. 
As a result, the measured effect of Mayo, both in magnitude and statistical 
significance, might be underestimated by the model in this Article. That would 
suggest that the shift in deference regime could be even more consequential than 
this Article indicates. 
Second, developments in APA jurisprudence after Mayo also might 
confound estimates of Mayo’s direct effects. These include recent Tax Court and 
Ninth Circuit rulings in Altera Corporation v. Commissioner, which dealt with 
Chevron and State Farm issues and which drew heavily on Mayo;127 recent 
procedural changes, like OIRA review of Treasury regulations that began in 
2018;128 and broader developments in administrative law,129 such as recent 
 
124. See Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, TAX NOTES, June 20, 2011, at 1253. 
125. See generally Hickman, supra note 88 (arguing, after Mead but prior to Mayo, that administrative 
tax law should follow rules generally applicable in other fields of administrative law). 
126. For an early example, see Merrill & Watts, supra note 83, at 570-75. For a more recent example, 
see Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717 (2014). 
127. 898 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 131 (2020); 145 T.C. 3 (2015). 
128. See Clinton G. Wallace, Centralized Review of Tax Regulations, 70 ALA. L. REV. 455, 478-81 
(2018). 
129. Moreover, the difference-in-differences model controls for developments in administrative law 
not specific to tax law. 
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Supreme Court cases that linked Chevron and State Farm more explicitly.130 
These developments would tend to cause overestimation of the causal effect of 
Mayo, which would be problematic for the model in this Article.131 Luckily, these 
confounders can be addressed by shortening the window of time subject to 
analysis to end prior to the confounding events. Section IV.D conducts this 
alternative analysis and finds estimates that remain statistically significant, and in 
some cases even greater in magnitude. 
The third and most difficult category is any development approximately 
contemporaneous with Mayo. The most troubling candidate is Cohen v. United 
States,132 a D.C. Circuit ruling which held that IRS subregulatory guidance could 
constitute a “final agency action” reviewable by courts.133 Cohen concerned 
subregulatory guidance promulgated without notice and comment, whereas Mayo 
concerned interpretative tax regulations subject to notice and comment.134 Thus, 
Cohen should primarily affect IRS revenue rulings, notices, and other 
subregulatory documents that are not studied in this Article. Moreover, because 
it represented the decision of only one circuit on an unusually egregious set of 
facts,135 its influence on broader IRS practice may have been limited. And, to the 
extent that Cohen was finally decided only after Mayo and cited Mayo,136 it might 
more properly be considered an application of Mayo rather than a separate event. 
But the broader point remains: court decisions, no matter how momentous 
or surprising, are not as exogenous as earthquakes and hurricanes. They are 
written in a context that includes a constant stream of new scholarship, court 
rulings, and administrative reform. This Article employs a variety of techniques 
to isolate the effect of the treatment on the treated, but its findings are only one 
piece of evidence and could be usefully supplemented by future studies. 
E. Limitations 
Part V employs various specification checks to buttress this Article’s central 
difference-in-differences model. But some challenges resist statistical checks. 
First, because this Article uses interpretative tax regulations as its treatment 
group, there is a question of external validity—how similar is the IRS to other 
 
130. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699, 2706 (2015). 
131. Note that these developments are only confounders if we treat them as independent events rather 
than consequences of Mayo. Given that they cite and are directly influenced by Mayo, it is not clear that this 
treatment is correct, but it is at least more cautious. 
132. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Federal Excise Tax Refund Litigation, 539 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 
2008), rev’d, Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 
717 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
133. Cohen, 578 F.3d at 12. 
134. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 US 44, 54 (2011).  
135. Cohen concerned an excise tax that the IRS had erroneously collected and agreed to refund only 
for taxpayers who went through a “virtual obstacle course.” Cohen, 650 F.3d at 736. The D.C. Circuit noted that 
“[t]he litigation position of the IRS throughout the history of the excise tax has been startling.” Id. 
136. Cohen, 650 F.3d at 736. The opposite is not true, that is, Mayo did not cite Cohen. 
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agencies? How closely can we expect the specific experience of the IRS to 
generalize if Chevron is entirely eliminated? Federal agencies are sprawling 
bureaucracies with deep institutional idiosyncrasies, perhaps so much so that no 
single agency can serve as a test case for others. 
While no two agencies are exactly the same, it is reasonable to expect some 
similarities in how different agencies would respond to changes in the level of 
judicial deference. The causal stories presented in this Article for why judicial 
deference would change regulatory methods does not depend on quirks of the 
IRS, but rather on high-level incentives that one would encounter in any agency. 
While external validity is always a concern, events that affect only a subset of 
agencies remain our best means to evaluate the causal effect of deference regimes 
on regulatory activity. 
Similarly, National Muffler was a standard of review specific to tax law—the 
more salient question for administrative law in general is not the difference 
between National Muffler and Chevron, but between Skidmore and Chevron. It 
is especially striking that Chevron would differ from National Muffler, since both 
require courts to defer to “reasonable” agency interpretations, whereas Skidmore 
deference is conceptually much further from Chevron. Thus, to the extent that 
National Muffler was an intermediate deference standard between Skidmore and 
Chevron, that would imply that the elimination of Chevron would be even more 
dramatic than the findings in this Article suggest. 
Moreover, after Mayo, some doubt remains about whether Treasury 
regulations that become effective prior to notice and comment (like temporary 
regulations) should receive Chevron deference.137 This could mean that post-
Mayo regulations may not receive the degree of heightened deference that one 
might have anticipated, which would attenuate the estimated causal effect of 
Mayo. Or, inversely, the estimated treatment effect might be reduced if agencies 
other than the IRS were emboldened by Mayo. If these other agencies took Mayo 
as a signal of the Supreme Court’s interest in enforcing Chevron, then Mayo might 
have encouraged them to rely on Chevron more heavily than before. If so, then 
the control group would also have received some of the treatment effect, and the 
comparison between the treatment and control groups would not be as clean. 
Again, these problems would attenuate the measured effect of Mayo and 
therefore decrease the estimated effect of Chevron. That implies that the effect 
magnitudes and statistical significance of the results in this Article may be 
underestimated. Consequently, it may be safest to interpret these effect sizes as 
lower bounds in magnitude for the causal effect of Chevron. 
 
137. Lederman, supra note 84, at 662-63; Hickman, supra note 86, at 1760 (“Treasury is not the only 
agency that promulgates binding regulations in advance of seeking and considering public comments. 
Nevertheless, the courts generally consider regulations issued through such a process procedurally invalid unless 
one of the four exceptions listed in APA section 553 applies. Many if not most Treasury regulations do not fall 
within the scope of those exceptions.”).  




A. Statutory and Normative Terms 
To test the relative importance of legal and policy considerations in agency 
rulemaking, this Article examines the relative frequencies of normative terms—
those referring to normative issues, like fairness and efficiency—and statutory 
terms—those referring to statutory interpretation. 
Simple trends suggest that Mayo marked a significant shift away from 
statutory explanations for rulemaking and toward normative explanations. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the annual average term frequencies for normative and 
statutory terms,138 along with trend lines139 separating interpretative tax 
regulations from all other regulations. (The year-by-year figures in this Article 
generally exclude 2000 as a partial year.) These figures suggest an inflection point 
when Mayo was decided, after which interpretative tax regulations become more 
normative and less statutory relative to other regulations. 
 
 
138. Averages are calculated as the number of terms of a particular type across all regulations issued 
that year, divided by the total word count of regulations issued that year. “Other” regulations include both non-
interpretative tax regulations and non-tax regulations. 
139. The smoothed trend lines throughout this Article are generated using locally estimated 
scatterplot smoothing, a non-parametric form of local regression that fits a smooth curve to data points. See 
WILLIAM S. CLEVELAND, THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA 168-73 (rev. ed. 1994) (describing LOESS). 
All of the confidence intervals in this Article are calculated using bootstrapping. Given a sample of data points, 
bootstrapping recreates a sample of the same size by randomly sampling (with replacement) from the original 
sample. This is repeated a number of times, here 2000 times, and LOESS curves are recalculated with respect 
to each bootstrapped sample. For each point on the graph’s x-axis (here, each point in time), the values of each 
bootstrapped LOESS curve are stored and then used to calculate a confidence interval.  
The confidence intervals follow the basic bootstrap (also known as the “reverse percentile,” 
“pivotal,” or “empirical” bootstrap) equation. The basic bootstrap calculates confidence intervals using 
some α such that the probability of an estimate lying within the confidence interval is 1-α. For example, 
given α = 0.05 (a 95% confidence interval), then for any point on the x-axis, where 𝜃 is the LOESS value 
in the original sample, 𝜃"."$%∗ 	is the 2.5th-percentile bootstrapped value, and 𝜃"."(%∗  is the 97.5th-percentile 
bootstrapped value, the confidence interval equals: 
 
 (2𝜃 − 𝜃"."(%∗ , 2𝜃 − 𝜃"."$%∗ )  
 
A. C. DAVISON & D. V. HINKLEY, BOOTSTRAP METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATION 194 (1997). Note that the 
confidence intervals are the confidence intervals of the curve, not confidence intervals of observations. That is, 
within each interval with respect to a given point on the x-axis, there is an estimated 95% probability that the 
true regression line lies within that interval. But this does not imply that there is a 95% probability that any 
observation will lie within that interval. The latter probability would be captured by a prediction interval, which 
would take into account both uncertainty regarding the regression line as well as pointwise variance in the 
distribution of observations. 
 See generally Choi, supra note 36, at 377 n.64 (providing an identical explanation of LOESS and 
bootstrapping in a similar context). 
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Figure 5: Frequency of Statutory Terms in Regulatory Preambles, 2001-2020 
 
 
These graphs can be further supplemented with regression analysis. 
Regression analysis provides a specific estimate of the treatment effect and 
controls for potential confounding variables. The full list of control variables and 
more detailed methodologies are discussed in Section G of the Appendix.  
Table 1 reports key findings from the regression analysis, which are laid out 
in more detail in Appendix Section G. Tables 14 and 15 in the Appendix contain 
full results from these regressions. All of the key results are statistically significant 
at a 99% confidence level. In raw numerical terms (rather than percentage terms), 
the average marginal effect of Mayo was to increase the frequency of normative 
terms by 154.4 per million words (against a baseline average of 186.6 normative 
terms per million across the entire sample), and to decrease the frequency of 
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statutory terms by 68.6 terms per million words (against a baseline average of 
104.2 statutory terms across the entire sample).140 
 
Table 1: Estimated Treatment Effects for Normative and Statutory Terms, 
2000-2020 
 
Change in . . .  
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms +126.8%*** 
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are 
Used 
+22.6%*** 
Overall Normative Term Frequency +137.3%*** 
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms -37.7%*** 
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used -20.9%*** 
Overall Statutory Term Frequency -48.5%*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the application of Chevron 
deference to interpretative tax regulations had a large and statistically significant 
effect on Treasury practice. These effects occurred along two different 
dimensions. First, relative to other regulations, Mayo triggered an additional 
increase in the likelihood that preambles of interpretative tax regulations would 
discuss normative issues at all. Second, among the preambles that use normative 
terms, Mayo triggered an additional increase in the frequency of normative terms 
that interpretative tax regulations use. This implies that the baseline likelihood of 
using normative terms comparatively increased alongside the intensity of those 
terms’ use. Similarly, Mayo triggered a relative decrease in the likelihood that 
preambles of interpretative tax regulations would discuss statutory issues at all, 
and triggered a relative decrease in the frequency of statutory terms when they 
were used. Again, this implies a comparative decrease both in the baseline 
likelihood of any statutory discussion alongside a decrease in the intensity of such 
discussion. 
The overall picture is remarkably consistent. Mayo marked a shift toward 
more normative and less statutory justifications for interpretative tax regulations, 
compared to other regulations. This played out both in the likelihood of using 
 
140. Average marginal effects are calculated by estimating individual marginal effects per observation, 
and then taking the average of these estimated marginal effects across the entire sample. They should not be 
confused with marginal effects at the means, which are computed by subtracting the mean dependent variable 
values between two groups (e.g., interpretative tax preambles before and after Mayo). 
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those terms at all, and the intensity of usage when Treasury did use those terms. 
These changes were statistically significant and consistently large in magnitude.141  
What does this mean for efforts to reform Chevron? In some respects, it 
underscores the claims of Chevron’s critics, who have long suggested that 
Chevron causes a shift in focus away from legal issues and toward policy issues. 
At the same time, many of Chevron’s supporters may be untroubled by these 
results, and may in fact find this effect of Chevron desirable. The findings most 
undercut those skeptics of Chevron who believe that it has little or no effect. 
Regardless of the ongoing debate over the application of Chevron by courts, this 
Article underscores that for agencies, Chevron matters a great deal. 
B. Procedural Effort 
This Article uses two different proxies of agency effort in complying with 
rulemaking procedures: preamble length and the frequency of references to 
commenters. Ceteris paribus, a longer preamble provides more detail and better 
satisfies the requirements of State Farm and the APA. (Because the regression 
analysis controls for regulation length, it specifically studies increases in preamble 
length holding regulation length constant.) Likewise, the frequency of references 
to commenters reflects an agency’s relative interest in addressing public 
comments.  
Figures 6 and 7 suggest that Mayo caused a disjunction in the length of 
interpretative tax preambles and the frequency of references to commenters. (The 
slope of the curve for preamble length prior to Mayo raises issues with the 
difference-in-differences model, which Sections IV.F through IV.H address in 
greater detail.) 
 
Figure 6: Word Count of Regulatory Preambles, 2001-2020 
 
 
141. Note that the changes are relative rather than absolute. The preambles to interpretative tax 
regulations will naturally still discuss statutes a great deal; this Article finds not that they discuss statutes little, 
but that they discuss them less. 








These trends are generally consistent with the hypothesis that heightened 
Chevron deference encourages agencies to exert additional rulemaking effort. 
However, note that the upward shift after Mayo in Figure 6 is much larger than in 
Figure 7. The magnitude of the shift in Figure 7 is very small and very noisy, 
suggesting that additional regression analysis is required.  
Table 2 presents key regression results; the full results are in Tables 17 and 
18 of the Appendix. Note that preamble length is examined in a single-step 
regression. This is because preamble length should never be zero, so the first-step 
regression is not required. 
 
Table 2: Regression Results for Preamble Length and Frequency of 
References to Commenters, 2000-2020 
 
Change in . . .  
Average Preamble Length +18.9%** 
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters +1.1% 
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to +34.7%*** 
Overall Commenter Term Frequency +35.8%* 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regression analysis suggests that Mayo significantly increased the average 
length of preambles by 18.9%. The analysis also suggests that Mayo increased the 
frequency of references to commenters, albeit in a subtler way. Based on these 
results, Mayo did not significantly affect the likelihood of any particular preamble 
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referring to commenters; however, it significantly increased the intensity of 
discussion of comments by 34.7%. This latter finding makes intuitive sense. Some 
regulations only refer to public comments cursorily, or do so in passing while 
acknowledging the agency’s obligations to consider comments under the APA.142 
The term frequency of references to commenters conditional on at least one 
reference is a much better proxy for the depth of engagement with public 
comments. The overall estimated effect of Mayo on references to public 
comments is also large in magnitude, although because it is a noisier estimate, it 
is less statistically significant than the other results in this Article.  
In non-percentage terms, the average marginal effect of Mayo was to 
increase preamble length by 250.3 words (against a baseline average of 1355.7 
words across the entire sample) and to increase references to commenters by 
183.5 words per million (against a baseline average of 599.8 words across the 
entire sample). 
The link between Chevron deference and procedural effort finds additional 
support in the academic commentary that followed Mayo. Although Mayo only 
concerned the application of Chevron to an interpretative tax regulation and not 
Treasury’s obligation to conduct notice and comment, some scholars drew the 
connection on their own: they argued that because Chevron deference only 
applied to regulations carrying the force of law, and because regulations carrying 
the force of law must be promulgated through notice and comment, any ruling 
that expanded the reach of Chevron among tax regulations necessarily expanded 
notice and comment obligations as well.143  
The Chief Counsel of the IRS noted shortly after Mayo that “great power 
bring[s] great responsibility,” and that the new application of Chevron deference 
obligated the IRS to “make choices based on wise public policy,” to “consider 
secondary and tertiary effects on stakeholders and the regulatory system writ 
large,” and to “consult at length with affected internal and external parties.”144 
Moreover, immediately after Mayo, the IRS revised its internal guidelines to drop 
the longstanding claim that “most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative, 
and therefore not subject to” procedural requirements under the APA.145 Thus 
the scholarly commentary, statements from key IRS officials, and changes to IRS 
guidelines all support the view that procedural effort serves as the price of 
deference. 
Procedural requirements play an important role in ongoing debates over the 
future of Chevron. Some scholars have suggested that Chevron should be 
modified to ask more deeply whether preambles provide adequate explanation 
 
142. Updating OSHA Standards Based on National Consensus Standards; Signage, 78 Fed. Reg. 
35,560 (June 13, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1926). 
143. E.g., Richard W. Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J. 
ONLINE 21, 23 (2014); Michael Hall, From Muffler to Mayo: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Apply Chevron 
to Treasury Regulations and Its Impact on Taxpayers, 65 TAX LAW. 695, 708-09 (2012). 
144. IRS Chief Counsel Discusses Guidance, IRS Challenges, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 22-15 (Jan. 
25, 2011). 
145. Hickman, supra note 85, at 495-96 n.164. 
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for rulemaking. Catherine Sharkey, for example, recently proposed the 
incorporation of State Farm “reasoned decisionmaking” review into Chevron, 
requiring judges to take a “hard look” at the policy rationale for rulemaking 
rather than labelling any choice between two permissible interpretations of a 
statute per se reasonable.146 Other administrative law scholars have suggested 
similar moves that substantively evaluate agency explanations for regulations as 
part of Chevron step two.147  
Most of these sources describe increased scrutiny during Chevron as 
normatively desirable, but not yet established doctrine. They also suggest that 
Chevron step two provides sufficient deference that agencies have little incentive 
to explain the policies underlying their rules.148 But if agencies treat increased 
public engagement as the price of deference, it could be that one key benefit of 
more intense judicial review during Chevron step two—more careful deliberation 
by agencies during rulemaking—is already present under the status quo. That is, 
Chevron might already incentivize agencies to engage in a more thorough and 
responsive rulemaking process. 
The evidence from this Article that Chevron increases procedural effort 
ultimately complements the recommendations of scholars attempting to bring 
hard-look review into Chevron step two. It suggests that wholesale elimination of 
Chevron would exacerbate existing complaints that agencies provide inadequate 
explanation for their rulemaking.149 Thus, scholars hoping for a beefier 
rulemaking process should push for reform, rather than elimination, of Chevron 
deference. 
C. Case Studies 
Consider two case studies that concretely illustrate this Article’s quantitative 
findings. The first is a set of regulations promulgated in 2008, roughly three years 
prior to Mayo;150 the second is a set of regulations promulgated in 2014, roughly 
three years after.151 These regulations illustrate a shift away from legal analysis 
and toward policy analysis, as well as an uptick in procedural effort. Both 
regulations cite section 7805 of the Code as their sole source of authority,152 
 
146. Sharkey, supra note 29. 
147. E.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 29; Levin, supra note 79. 
148. E.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 29, at 131 (“HHS, however, failed to explain how its interpretation 
responded to many of the policy concerns raised by the comments filed in the rulemaking proceeding.”). 
149. E.g., Sharkey, supra note 29, at 2365. 
150. Suspension of Statutes of Limitations in Third-Party and John Doe Summons Disputes and 
Expansion of Taxpayers’ Rights To Receive Notice and Seek Judicial Review of Third-Party Summonses, 73 
Fed. Reg. 23,342 (Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Summonses Regulations]. 
151. Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 79 Fed. Reg. 26,616 (May 9, 2014) [hereinafter 
Section 67 Limitations]. 
152. Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,342-44; Section 67 Limitations, supra note 151, at 
26,616-18. 
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making them interpretative tax regulations. Both were final regulations issued 
following notice and comment on earlier proposed regulations.153 
The first, pre-Mayo set of regulations governs the summonses that the IRS 
issues to third parties in the course of tax assessments. The preamble to these 
regulations responded to extensive public comments. But the responses were 
relatively cursory, and Treasury rejected all of the suggestions received in the 
public comments. Moreover, it did so on exclusively statutory grounds, using 
familiar tools of statutory interpretation: reference to statutory text,154 
longstanding regulatory interpretations to which Congress was presumed to 
acquiesce,155 the history of statutory amendments,156 and the general structure of 
the statute.157 
The second, post-Mayo set of regulations governs the deductibility of costs 
incurred by trusts and estates.158 This preamble also responded to public 
comments, but in much greater detail—although the underlying regulations were 
roughly a quarter the length of the earlier set, the preamble was slightly longer.159 
This time around, Treasury was both more responsive to public comments and 
more policy-focused. It accepted many of the suggestions proposed by 
commenters.160 Moreover, the more recent preamble emphasized normative 
justifications for its rulemaking. In response to a comment arguing that Treasury 
lacked statutory authority to promulgate the regulations, the preamble described 
various grounds on which the regulation was normatively desirable: that it 
“provides equitable tax treatment to similarly situated taxpayers” and “reduces 
administrative burdens.”161 These rationales reflect a shift toward policy and away 
from law, and they are consistent with the high frequency of normative terms in 
 
153. Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,343; Section 67 Limitations, supra note 151, at 
26,616. 
154. Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,343 (emphasizing that the regulations were 
“consistent with the language” of the statute); id. at 23,344 (arguing that a commenter’s suggestion “goes beyond 
the statutory language and the IRS's authority to promulgate regulations”). 
155. Id. at 23,343 (“Nothing in the statutory amendments . . . since these regulations were promulgated 
suggests that Congress intended to change” the meaning of “longstanding regulations” already issued.); see also 
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1879 (2015) 
(discussing “the prevailing wisdom that longstanding agency statutory interpretations should receive heightened 
judicial deference”). 
156. Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,343 (describing language changes in a 1998 
statutory amendment); id. at 23,344 (“[T]hese regulations are interpretative of statutory provisions that have 
existed as law for several years”). 
157. Id. at 23,344 (dismissing a suggestion as unnecessary in light of “the statutory structure”). 
158. Section 67 Limitations, supra note 151, at 26,616. 
159. The first set of regulations was 5325 words long, with a preamble of 2067 words; the second set 
was 1308 words long, with a preamble of 2439 words. It is possible that any increase in procedural effort after 
Mayo occurred at the cost of actually writing regulations themselves; this would be an interesting question for 
future research. 
160. Id. at 26,616-18. 
161. Id. at 26,618. It also cited a relevant case, but did not engage in conventional statutory 
interpretation. Id. 
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the later regulatory preamble, in contrast with the high frequency of statutory 
terms in the earlier regulatory preamble.162 
IV. Specification Checks 
This Part discusses a number of tests that validate the model used in this 
Article and check its sensitivity to variations in specifications.  
A. Reading Preambles to Confirm Proxy Terms 
To confirm the validity of the terms chosen as proxies for discussion of 
normative issues, statutory issues, public comments, and legislative history, I 
randomly selected 160 regulatory preambles containing instances of these terms 
(40 preambles for each category, 20 from the period 2000–2009 and 20 from the 
period 2010–2019), out of the dataset used in this Article.163 I then manually 
reviewed each preamble to check that the terms were used as expected. Upon 
review, I found eight instances where the term did not accurately refer to the 
concept it was meant as a proxy for, whereas in the other 595 instances, the terms 
were used as intended.164 The overall false positive rate in the sample was 
therefore 1.3%.165 
The full list of preambles, including the specific terms used and full citations 
to the regulations reviewed, along with explanations where terms were not used 
as expected, is available online.166 
B. Regulatory Selection Effects 
Another potential issue is the possibility of selection effects in the agency’s 
choice between regulations and subregulatory guidance. We could imagine a 
simple model in which an agency seeking to promulgate any given policy chooses 
whether to do so in a regulation, subject to Chevron deference or National 
Muffler deference, or in subregulatory guidance, subject to Skidmore deference. 
Any change in the level of deference accorded to regulations might affect not just 
the agency’s approach to the regulations it otherwise would have promulgated, 
 
162. These regulatory preambles were selected as representative of the relevant shifts—the earlier 
regulatory preamble has 5 statutory terms and 0 normative terms out of 2067 words, whereas the later regulatory 
preamble has 4 normative terms and 0 statutory terms out of 2439 words.  
163. The preambles included both tax and non-tax preambles; because non-tax preambles 
substantially outnumber tax preambles, the majority of the randomly selected preambles were non-tax. 
164. There were 603 instances of terms in total: 50 normative terms from the 2000s, 77 normative terms 
from the 2010s, 34 statutory terms from the 2000s, 39 statutory terms from the 2010s, 89 commenter terms from 
the 2000s, 212 commenter terms from the 2010s, 75 legislative history terms from the 2000s, and 27 legislative 
history terms from the 2010s. 
165. For consistency, the false positives manually identified were not dropped from the sample. 
166. Online Appendix: Randomly Selected Preambles to Confirm Term Frequency Results, 
JONATHAN H. CHOI, jonathanhchoi.com/s/Randomly-Selected-Preambles.pdf (last updated Aug. 6, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/P6HD-7FTT]. 
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but might also cause the agency to substitute away from subregulatory guidance 
and toward regulations. Thus, even if an agency’s approach to any particular 
policy remains the same, the average content of regulations might shift solely as a 
result of this substitution. 
Do selection effects drive the results in this Article? One reason to suspect 
not is that the IRS has long been constrained in the resources that it can assign to 
draft regulations. All published IRS guidance, both regulatory and subregulatory, 
is issued by the Office of Associate Chief Counsel.167 The IRS publishes a Priority 
Guidance Plan each year describing which regulations it will attempt to 
promulgate,168 but many issues flagged by taxpayers will not be addressed in 
regulations for years. Moreover, because guidance is frequently time-sensitive, 
Treasury often issues subregulatory guidance in advance of regulations, either to 
clarify the law for taxpayers169 or to head off potentially abusive transactions.170 
All of these constraints will limit Treasury’s ability to freely select between types 
of guidance. 
In addition, if substitution were to occur toward an increased number of 
formal regulations, we would expect Treasury to issue a greater proportion of 
regulations to subregulatory guidance after Mayo. Figure 8 graphs the total 
number of tax regulations171 divided by the total number of revenue rulings 
promulgated each year, from 2000 to 2020. It shows the opposite trend—that the 
ratio actually declined after Mayo.172 
 
 
167. I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.1(4) (Nov. 13, 2019) (“Associate Chief Counsel 
offices are solely responsible for issuing published guidance.”). Note, however, that “on some projects, members 
of Operating Divisions may be involved in the development of a project.” Id. § 32.1.1.4.4(1) (Aug. 2, 2018). 
168. I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.4.1 (Aug. 2, 2018). 
169. For example, Notice 2018-76 provided guidance in advance of Proposed Regulation 100814-19 on 
the deductibility of business meals. I.R.S. Notice 2018-76, 2018-42 I.R.B. 599; Meals and Entertainment 
Expenses Under Section 274, 85 Fed. Reg. 11,020 (proposed Feb. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.274-
11, 1.274-12). 
170. For example, Notices 2014-52 and 2015-79 provided guidance in advance of Proposed Regulation 
135734-14 on the treatment of inversion transactions. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712; I.R.S. Notice 
2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions; Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking by Cross-Reference to Temporary Regulations, 82 Fed. Reg. 5476 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.7874-7, 1.7874-10). 
171. This includes both interpretative and legislative regulations. 
172. The absolute number of tax regulations issued per year also declined after Mayo. 
Legal Analysis, Policy Analysis, and the Price of Deference 
859 
 
Figure 8: Total Tax Regulations / Revenue Rulings Per Year, 2000-2020 
 
 
If anything, the decline in the ratio of regulatory-to-subregulatory guidance 
might support the ossification hypothesis—that, in order to spend greater time 
and effort promulgating each regulation, Treasury counterintuitively decreased 
the total number of new regulations that it issued each year. On the other hand, 
this decline in new regulations may also have been attributable to Trump-era 
executive orders generally making it more difficult for agencies to promulgate 
new regulations,173 or budget cuts forcing the IRS to favor subregulatory guidance 
(which is issued without resource-intensive notice and comment). While the 
precise explanation for the substitution toward subregulatory guidance exceeds 
the scope of this Article, it would be an interesting topic for future research. 
C. Legislative History as an Alternative Proxy for Statutory Terms 
The frequency of statutory terms, as used in this Article, is calculated based 
on the number of times that an agency discusses statutes at all, for example by 
discussing how a “statute” should be “construed.”174 An alternative and more 
specific proxy for statutory discussion is discussion of legislative history—for 
example, the frequency of citations to Senate reports, House floor debates, and 
other forms of legislative history. The term frequency of legislative history can be 
used as a dependent variable in a regression in the same way as the term frequency 
of normative or statutory terms.  
 
173. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (directing agencies to repeal 
two existing regulations for every new regulation). 
174. See infra Appendix Section C.2. For purposes of defining statutory terms, this Article does not 
distinguish between interpretation and construction. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) (discussing the distinction). 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:818 2021 
860 
Because legislative history is the tool of statutory interpretation most 
commonly used by agencies,175 we would expect it to follow the same trend as 
statutory terms in general. That is, we would expect the treatment effect to be 
negative with respect to legislative history, as with statutory terms. Table 3 shows 
the results of a regression studying the term frequency of legislative history, 
excerpted from Table 19 in the Appendix.176 As expected, the overall treatment 
effect is negative, and the decline in the likelihood of any citations to legislative 
history is statistically significant at the 99% level. However, the intensity of 
discussion of legislative history essentially does not change. This suggests that the 
more reliable effect of heightened deference may be to decrease the likelihood of 
any statutory discussion at all.  
 
Table 3: Regression Results for Legislative History Terms, 2000-2020 
 
Change in . . .  
Likelihood of Using Any Legislative History Terms -23.0%*** 
Term Frequency if Legislative History Terms Are 
Used 
+2.4% 
Overall Legislative History Term Frequency -20.9%* 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In theory, another proxy for statutory references might be textualist terms—
for example, citations to dictionaries and certain canons of interpretation, like 
language canons, which are favored by textualists.177 However, as I noted in a 
previous article, the IRS has remained adamantly purposivist and uses virtually 
no distinctively textualist terms (like language canons or dictionaries) in its 
preambles, despite the rise of textualism at the Tax Court and other federal 
courts.178 The dataset used in this Article reveals that this finding generalizes to 
other agencies as well: textualist terms are so rare that they cannot be statistically 
analyzed using term frequency. 
D. Shortened-Window Regression Analysis, 2006-2015  
Figures 4 and 5 suggest a general trend that the regression analysis supports, 
that Mayo caused a break in Treasury’s approach to promulgating interpretative 
tax regulations. However, visual inspection suggests that the results may be 
 
175. Choi, supra note 36, at 397-98 (describing how the IRS generally relies on legislative history to 
the exclusion of textualist interpretive tools). 
176. Table 19 in the Appendix provides additional details from this regression. 
177. Choi, supra note 36, at 384 n.90. 
178. Id. at 397-98. Of course, the IRS frequently pays great attention to statutory text, but this is not a 
distinctly textualist technique, since purposivists also prioritize statutory text as important evidence of statutory 
meaning. 
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disproportionately driven by changes within the last few years, especially the 
increase in normative terms since 2018 shown in Figure 4. This is concerning, 
because it might cause the treatment effect to be conflated with other important 
recent events in tax administration—for example, the focus of the Trump 
administration on issues of fairness and efficiency,179 or 2017 tax reform,180 which 
may have caused a qualitative change in the type of regulations that Treasury 
issued in the most recent years (because they are issued with respect to new 
legislation).  
To address this concern, I replicate the regression analysis in Part C for a 
shorter window of time that only includes the five years before and after Mayo: 
2006–2015. Shrinking the window of time tests the robustness of the model to 
changes in specification and avoids outliers that may have been driven by recent 
events. 
 
Table 4: Regression Results for Normative Terms, Statutory Terms, 
Preamble Length, and References to Commenters, 2006-2015 
 
Change in . . .  
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms +55.6%** 
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are Used +14.3%** 
Overall Normative Term Frequency +63.7%** 
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms -61.2%*** 
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used -21.5%*** 
Overall Statutory Term Frequency -66.5%*** 
Average Preamble Length +12.0%*** 
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters -3.4% 
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to +20.7%*** 
Overall Commenter Term Frequency +17.2% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Full details from this regression are available in Table 20 in the Appendix. 
The overall results of the regression with a reduced window of time are similar. 
Table 4 shows that the sign of the coefficients for the key variable of interest are 
largely the same, and the results remain statistically significant at a 95% level or 
higher. The magnitudes of most of the findings are slightly smaller, except for the 
findings regarding statutory terms, which are larger than the baseline values in 
 
179. Exec. Order No. 13,789, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017) (directing agencies to promote 
regulations that are “simple, fair, efficient, and pro-growth”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 
12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (requiring agencies to undertake reforms intended to “lower regulatory burdens on the 
American people”). 
180. An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution 
on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
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Table 1. Because agencies take time to respond to changed incentives after court 
decisions, one would expect the treatment effect to be greater the more time has 
passed, and the decrease in magnitude is in line with this expectation. Moreover, 
because regulations can take years from proposal to completion, we should expect 
some lag before the effects of Chevron are fully visible. 
The shortened-window findings are especially reassuring because of recent 
developments in administrative tax law that otherwise might have biased the 
results in this Article: Altera, Encino Motorcars, Michigan v. EPA, and reforms 
to OIRA review of tax regulations, as discussed above.181 This specification check 
suggests that the findings in this Article are not merely due to confounders.  
E. Winsorized Regression Analysis 
An alternative method that reduces the influence of outliers is to “winsorize” 
the dataset prior to conducting the regression, by replacing extreme values past 
some cutoff with values closer to the median. For purposes of this Article, I 
winsorize by taking the bottom 2.5% of values and replacing them with the 2.5th-
percentile value, and likewise by taking the top 2.5% of values and replacing them 
with the 97.5th-percentile value.182 The net effect is to reduce the magnitude of 
the outliers and therefore to reduce their prominence in the regression results. 
Table 5 excerpts the results of the winsorized regressions, while Table 21 in 
the Appendix contains full winsorized results. The key findings in this Article 
remain statistically significant. In addition, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
generally are smaller in the winsorized regressions; this is a typical consequence 
of winsorizing right-tailed datasets, which, while useful as a robustness check, 
does not produce point estimates that are preferable to the original specifications. 
 
 
181. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. 
182. The most common parameters for winsorizing are 95% (the one used in this Article) and 90%. 
Because so many of the term frequency values are zero, infra Appendix Section F, winsorizing the left tail has 
no effect, but winsorizing the right tail has a substantial effect on point estimates. 
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Table 5: Winsorized Regression Results, 2000-2020 
 
Change in . . .  
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms +126.8%*** 
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are Used +13.3%*** 
Overall Normative Term Frequency +119.2%*** 
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms -37.7%*** 
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used -13.4%*** 
Overall Statutory Term Frequency -43.6%*** 
Average Preamble Length +15.0%** 
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters +1.1% 
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to +23.6%*** 
Overall Commenter Term Frequency +24.7% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
F. Placebo Tests 
As noted above, a key assumption of the difference-in-differences model is 
that the treatment and control groups would have followed parallel trends absent 
the treatment. Because we cannot observe this counterfactual, the standard 
alternative is to ensure that the treatment and control groups at least followed 
parallel trends before the treatment. We can do this by visually inspecting pre-
treatment trends (pre-trends) to confirm that they were parallel prior to 2011.  
Figures 4 and 5 show that the pre-trends were similar between the treatment 
and control groups for normative and statutory terms. Figure 7 is more equivocal, 
but does not reveal obvious differences in pre-trends between the treatment and 
control groups. However, Figure 6 suggests that the pre-trends substantially 
differed for preamble length; the treatment group pre-trend sloped downward, 
while the control group pre-trend sloped upward, making the reversal after Mayo 
even sharper. 
Another test of the parallel trend assumption is the placebo test. 
Conventionally, a placebo test is conducted by excluding the post-treatment 
period, cutting the pre-treatment period in half, and assigning the second half of 
the pre-treatment period as a “placebo” treatment period. To conduct the placebo 
test, I exclude observations after Mayo and analyze the period 2000–2010,183 
assigning 2000–2005 as the pre-treatment period and 2006–2010 as the post-
treatment period. The results of the placebo test are in Table 6 below (excerpted 
from Table 22 in the Appendix), from regressions with full controls: 
 
 
183. The pre-treatment period used for the placebo test ends six months before Mayo is decided, to 
exclude anticipatory effects from briefs and oral arguments in the Mayo case that preceded the decision itself. 
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Table 6: Placebo Regression Results for Normative Terms, Statutory Terms, 
and Preamble Length, 2000-2020 
 
Change in . . .  
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms +14.7% 
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are Used -0.5% 
Overall Normative Term Frequency +11.3% 
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms +26.5% 
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used +2.7% 
Overall Statutory Term Frequency +27.6% 
Average Preamble Length -15.0%*** 
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters +11.6% 
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to +14.8% 
Overall Commenter Term Frequency +25.5% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The only statistically significant result from the placebo test is a decline in 
preamble length. This is consistent with the violation of the parallel trend 
assumption visible in Figure 6. The other results are both statistically insignificant 
and relatively small in magnitude, compared to the results in the baseline model. 
The results of the placebo test cannot confirm that the parallel trend assumption 
is satisfied—the insignificance of the results could be explained by low statistical 
power as well as by the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption—but they 
provide some additional reassurance in that direction. The exception, of course, 
is the result of the placebo test with respect to preamble length, which must be 
addressed in another way. 
G. Extrapolating Pre-Trends 
If the parallel trend assumption is violated, difference in differences will 
produce biased estimates and cannot be relied upon. The estimates might still be 
directionally correct if the pre-trends could merely be extrapolated into the post-
treatment period. If so, then the effect of Mayo on preamble length would merely 
be underestimated under conventional difference-in-differences analysis, because 
Mayo not only set the length of interpretative tax preambles on an upward trend 
but also reversed those preambles’ prior downward trend. Moreover, the 
difference-in-difference estimates could be corrected by extrapolating the 
differences in pre-trends to the post-treatment periods, a common approach in 
existing literature.184 
 
184. See, e.g., Carlos Dobkin et al., The Economic Consequences of Hospital Admissions, 108 AM. 
ECON. REV. 308 (2018); Manudeep et al., Broadband Internet: An Information Superhighway to Sex Crime?, 
80 REV. ECON. STUD. 1237, 1257 (2013). Following Manudeep et al., I extrapolate pre-trends by measuring the 
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Extrapolating pre-treatment time trends in the preamble length model 
predictably increases the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect. It increases 
the point estimate for the percentage change in average preamble length from 
18.9% to 29.6%. The full results from this regression are presented in Table 17 in 
the Appendix. 
 
Table 7: Regression Results for Preamble Length, Extrapolating Pre-Trends, 
2000-2020 
 
Change in . . .  
Average Preamble Length +29.6%*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, the assumption that pre-treatment time trends will persist into 
the post-treatment period is a strong one. A skeptic might instead suggest that 
the explanation was mean reversion—that some omitted variable caused a large 
but temporary drop in the length of IRS preambles prior to Mayo, which merely 
disappeared as IRS preamble lengths reverted to the mean after Mayo. If so, the 
effect of this omitted variable would be falsely attributed in the baseline model 
(even more so in the model extrapolating pre-trends) to Mayo. This Article 
cannot fully address this possibility; it provides reason to remain skeptical of the 
results regarding preamble length, and suggests that the price-of-deference 
model would benefit from further research. 
H. Synthetic Controls 
Another method to address violation of the parallel trend assumption is to 
use an entirely different model: synthetic controls. The synthetic control method 
does not assume that the treatment and control groups simply would have 
followed parallel trends absent the treatment. Instead, it uses a weighted 
combination of other agencies to generate a synthetic control group whose 
behavior is intended to approximate the behavior of the actual treatment group.  
 
slope of preamble length relative to year for the treatment and control groups for years before 2011. Given the 
slope estimate vg, for group g, where g is either the treatment group (interpretative tax regulations) or the control 
group (other regulations), I specify the following model: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ<]
= 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜<
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽% ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽P
∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< + 𝛽R ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< + 𝛽U
∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< + 𝛽( ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A" ∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ vg + 𝜖<  
 
Cf. Manudeep, supra, at 1257 (using an analogous model). 
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The synthetic control group is generated by taking a weighted average of the 
actual control groups (called the “donor groups”), as well as covariates, to 
minimize some loss function (usually mean squared prediction error185) with 
respect to the difference between the synthetic control and the treatment group 
for the pre-treatment period. The synthetic control group is then compared with 
the treatment group for the post-treatment periods, and any difference in the 
relevant dependent variable between the two groups is inferred to be attributable 
to the treatment.186  
Synthetic controls diverge from difference in differences in a variety of ways, 
two of which are particularly relevant here. First, synthetic control analysis is 
conducted on panel data where each observation is average term frequency or 
preamble length for a particular agency for a particular year. In contrast, the 
difference-in-differences analysis in this Article uses individual regulations as 
observations, meaning that the difference-in-differences regressions consider a 
much larger N than the synthetic control analysis. Second, as has been extensively 
discussed above, difference in differences assumes parallel trends. While the 
synthetic control method involves its own set of assumptions,187 it crucially does 
not assume parallel trends. 
Figures 9 through 12 below compare estimated term frequencies and 
preamble lengths for the actual IRS and a synthetic IRS.188 In most years prior to 
Mayo, the point estimates for the IRS and the synthetic IRS are relatively close 
together, diverging in the expected directions after Mayo.189 
 
 
185. See Alberto Abadie, Using Synthetic Controls: Feasibility, Data Requirements, and 
Methodological Aspects, J. ECON. LIT. at *8-*9 (forthcoming 2021). 
186. All of the synthetic control analysis in this Article was conducted in R, using the Gsynth package 
published by Yiqing Xu and Licheng Liu. Yiqing Xu & Licheng Liu, Gsynth: Generalized Synthetic Control 
Method, https://yiqingxu.org/software/gsynth/gsynth_examples.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/HM6H-3SS9]. Gsynth was used because of its ability to process unbalanced datasets. 
187. Abadie, supra note 185, at *25-*32. 
188. Strictly speaking, the treatment group is the group of interpretative tax regulations, since the IRS 
also issues legislative regulations that are not part of the treatment group for purposes of this analysis. These 
group names are adopted for greater simplicity. 
189. Again, the trend lines are produced through locally estimated scatterplot smoothing. The 
confidence intervals are calculated using α = 0.1. 
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Figure 9: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Normative Term Frequency, 2000-2020 
 
 
Figure 10: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Statutory Term Frequency, 2000-2020 
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Figure 11: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Preamble Length, 2000-2020 
 
 
Figure 12: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Commenter Term Frequency, 2000-2020 
 
 
In addition to graphical results, average estimated effects can be calculated 
for the post-treatment period, and confidence intervals can be calculated by 
bootstrapping the results.190   
 
 
190. Specifically, the standard errors were calculated using non-parametric bootstrapping. See Xu & 
Liu, supra note 186. 
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Normative Term Frequency (per 
Million Words) 
+186.7*** 146.8 – 226.7 
Statutory Term Frequency (per 
Million Words) 
-209.5*** -352.9 – -66.1 
Preamble Length +531.2*** 352.1 – 710.4 
Commenter Term Frequency (per 
Million Words) 
+144.0 -85.2 – 373.3 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Synthetic controls provide some additional assurance that the main results in 
this Article are valid. However, some doubt remains. Notably, the commenter 
term frequency results are small in magnitude and exceptionally noisy, yielding 
no statistically significant result. These initial results suggest that an effect may 





Although empirical scholars have extensively studied how courts apply 
Chevron deference, almost none have examined Chevron’s effect on agencies. 
While agency administrators are aware of Chevron deference, many have 
suggested that Chevron may have little or no effect, either because it is rarely 
applied by courts or because its alternatives are equally deferential. 
This Article exploits the unique shift from National Muffler deference to 
Chevron deference in 2011 to study the effect of Chevron deference on agency 
rulemaking. It suggests that preambles to regulations that received newly 
heightened deference increasingly discussed normative goals rather than 
underlying statutes. This in turn suggests that heightened Chevron deference 
encourages agencies to emphasize policymaking rather than legal interpretation. 
In addition, the Article proposes and provides some empirical evidence for 
a new theory of the relationship between judicial deference and rulemaking 
procedures: that agencies view the requirements of State Farm and the APA as 
the price of deference and will therefore spend more effort complying with those 
requirements if granted more judicial deference. Empirical research suggests that, 
after Mayo, the IRS began to write longer preambles with more extensive 
discussion of public comments. However, these latter results are more tentative, 
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and additional research is warranted on the plausibility of the price-of-deference 
model. 
These findings have a variety of implications for the study of administrative 
and tax law. They contribute to the literature on tax exceptionalism, suggesting 
that tax law’s special deference regime restrained Treasury from interpreting tax 
statutes with the same emphasis on policy that has predominated at other 
agencies. Mayo therefore set the stage for the pronounced shift toward normative 
goals reflected in modern tax regulations. In turn, this shift affords each new 
presidential administration considerable freedom in reforming administrative tax 
law: for example, the Trump administration’s sweeping directive that Treasury 
cultivate tax regulations that are “simple, fair, efficient, and pro-growth.”191 
Most broadly, the findings suggest that judicial deference does substantially 
affect agency rulemaking. This provides a practical counter to arguments that 
Chevron is indistinguishable from other deference regimes. Some might conclude 
from these findings that Chevron allows agencies to encroach on policymaking 
territory that properly belongs to Congress, while also producing wastefully 
overlong preambles that go unread except by privileged commenters. Others 
might conclude that Chevron empowers agencies to properly deploy their 
expertise and encourages them to provide necessary guidance that responds to 
public feedback. Rather than favoring the arguments of either side, this Article 
provides the terrain for arguments about Chevron to take place. Regardless of 
theoretical commitments, this Article emphasizes the importance of Chevron in 





191. Exec. Order No. 13,789, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017); see also Eliminating Unnecessary 
Tax Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 9231, 9231 (Mar. 14, 2019) (eliminating 296 regulations that Treasury deemed 
“no longer necessary because they do not have any current or future applicability”); Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 
Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (requiring agencies to undertake reforms intended to “lower regulatory burdens 
on the American people”).  




A. Modeling the Price of Deference 
Take a simple utility model for a hypothetical agency: 
 
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃(𝑥) − 𝑥 (1) 
where: 
 
𝐸(𝑈) = Agency’s expected utility from rulemaking 
𝑏 = Benefit from agency rulemaking, which is lost if court 
overturns rule  
𝑑 = Probability that a regulation will be held a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute under the relevant deference 
regime 
𝑥 = Effort expended by the agency in rulemaking procedures, 
which will be higher when preambles are more detailed and 
responsive to public comments  
𝑃(𝑥) = Probability that a regulation will be held to comply with the 
procedural requirements of State Farm and section 553(c) of 
the APA. The greater the effort that the agency expends in 
complying with rulemaking procedures, the higher the 
likelihood that it will be held to comply with State Farm and 
section 553(c) 
 
The model assumes that P(x) increases strictly monotonically above 0 (i.e., 
increasing the probability of success increases utility) and has a negative second 
derivative (i.e., there are decreasing returns to procedural effort).192 Utility is 





> 0:  
 




(𝑈)] = 0 =
𝜕
𝜕𝑥 [𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃
(𝑥) − 𝑥] 
 
Pulling out linear multipliers and solving for the first derivative of 𝑥: 
 
0 = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 ∙
𝜕
𝜕𝑥 [𝑃
(𝑥)] 	− 1 
 
 
192. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 




𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 
 
By the implicit function theorem, we can totally differentiate this expression with 





𝑏	 ∙ 	𝑑$ 	 ∙ 	𝑃ff(𝑥) 
 
 
By assumption, P’’(x) < 0 (i.e., P(x) has a negative second derivative). Similarly, 
b > 0 (the agency has a positive benefit from successfully promulgating a 
regulation) and d2 > 0 by assumption, since d represents a constant probability 






𝑏	 ∙ 	𝑑$ 	 ∙ 	𝑃ff(𝑥) > 0 
 
In non-mathematical terms, any increase in the deference level d should be met 
with an increase in effort level x. 
 Note that this proof will apply for any function P(x) with monotonically 
increasing and marginally declining utility. For example, the graphs in the body 







But any other concave, monotonically increasing function could be used. It should 
also be noted that many plausible alternative models could generate opposite 
results. For example, under a “satisficing” model of agency utility, where agency 
administrators attempt to meet some threshold likelihood that a regulation will 
be upheld but are indifferent to increases above that threshold, Chevron 
deference might discourage additional effort by increasing the baseline likelihood 
that a regulation will be upheld above the satisficing threshold. Or, alternatively, 
if the probability that a regulation is upheld as a function of procedural effort is 
sigmoid for values of procedural effort greater than zero, then the proof above, 
which relies on monotonic decreases in the first derivative, will no longer work. 
For these reasons and others, the theoretical model presented in this Article is 
intended to suggest that the price-of-deference model is theoretically plausible 
and merits further empirical study, rather than as itself acting as a piece of 
evidence in favor of the price-of-deference model. 




This Article analyzes a new dataset developed using bulk data in XML 
format, downloaded from FederalRegister.Gov. The XML schema for these data 
is available online.193 
FederalRegister.Gov is an official government source for the rulemaking 
activity of federal agencies. It includes final regulations, as well as proposed 
regulations and temporary regulations. It also includes more procedural 
documents, like notices for public comment sessions on regulations. This Article 
analyzes all rulemaking documents, including proposed rulemaking, since 
proposed rulemaking contains important information about the agency’s 
justification for the rule and reflects the agency’s expectations regarding judicial 
deference. However, all purely procedural documents (like notices scheduling 
public comment sessions) were dropped from the analysis.194  
FederalRegister.Gov includes regulations from 2000 to the present. This 
provides a good range for the difference-in-differences study conducted by this 
Article, but regulations issued prior to 2000 could be useful for ancillary research 
questions—for example, a single-difference analysis of the effect of Chevron in 
1984. 
C. Terms Analyzed 
The terms analyzed in this Article are largely drawn from prior empirical 
work by myself and others, as noted in greater detail below.195 Using a consistent 
set of terms across articles reduces researcher degrees of freedom and is intended 
 
193. U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, User Guide Document: Federal Register XML Rendition (2009), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/bulkdata/FR/resources/FDsys_OFR-XML_User-Guide-v1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DV3G-MJKZ]. 
194. Any rule that lacked a preamble was also dropped. 
195. Bruhl, supra note 105, at 30-31, 38-39, 41, 53 (listing and describing the use of search terms to 
assess judicial purposivism, textualism, and canon use); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive 
Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1933-35, 1940-42, 1950-51, 1956-59 (2005); Choi, supra note 36, at 419-24 
(discussing the selection of statutory, normative, and purposivist terms). The terms were primarily drawn from 
my prior article, An Empirical Study of Statutory Interpretation in Tax Law, with appropriate modifications to 
generalize a set of terms specific to tax law to other agencies. I removed terms specifically referring to tax 
administration and removed references to the Congressional Budget Office. I also made modifications based on 
my random review of specific regulatory preambles. In particular, I removed “complexity” as a normative term, 
since a substantial minority of its occurrences discussed some aspect of the conduct being regulated rather than 
the complexity of the regulations themselves. E.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Theft Protection, 
71 Fed. Reg. 17,752 (Apr. 7, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571); Funding and Fiscal Affairs, Loan Policies 
and Operations, and Funding Operations; Investment Management, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,361 (Nov. 5, 2012) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 615); Basel III Conforming Amendments Related to Cross-References, Subordinated 
Debt and Limits Based on Regulatory Capital, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,300 (Feb. 28, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 4, 5, 16, 23, 24, 28, 32, 34, 46, 116, 143, 145, 159, 160, 161, 163, 192). I also removed “committee report” as 
a legislative history term, as it led to false positives when referring to reports of non-congressional committees. 
E.g., Irish Potatoes Grown in Washington; Modification of Special Purpose Shipment Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg. 
44,252 (Aug. 2, 2005) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 946); Apricots Grown in Designated Counties in 
Washington; Decreased Assessment Rate, 83 Fed. Reg. 4412 (Jan. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 922). 
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to allay concerns about cherry-picking terms to increase the statistical significance 
of results.196 For purposes of calculating term frequencies, the terms are not case-
sensitive and are therefore all listed in lower-case. In addition, prior to conducting 
the analysis, the text was cleaned and regularized by removing special characters 
and extra whitespace. Text matches included partial word matches—for example, 
the word “unfair” also includes “unfairness” and “unfairly.”197 
1. Normative Terms 
Any occurrences of normative terms in sentences that also included terms 
associated with statutory interpretation (legislative history, textualist interpretive 
tools, or canons of construction) were excluded, in order to avoid misclassifying 
discussions of policy judgments that occur in the statutory process.198 
 
good public policy burdensome 
public policy goal  compliance cost 
public policy grounds complexity 
efficient administration intrusive 
efficient enforcement fairness 
compliance burden unfair 
financial burden injustice 
administrative burden unjust 
regulatory burden clarity 
2. Statutory Terms 
Unlike the other terms in this Article, a document’s statutory term frequency 
was determined based on the number of statutory sentences. A sentence was 
designated as statutory if it included at least one word from the column on the left 
below, and one word from the column on the right below. In addition, sentences 
that include the word “section” but also include the phrase “executive order” 
were dropped in order to avoid false positives discussing the interpretation of 
executive orders rather than statutes.199  
 
196. Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed 
Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1359, 1359 
(2011) (describing researcher degrees of freedom as “exploratory behavior” by researchers who tend to “explore 
various analytic alternatives, to search for a combination that yields ‘statistical significance,’ and to then report 
only what ‘worked’”). 
197. This refers only to differences in prefixes or suffices. In contrast, “financially burdensome” would 
not be a match for “financial burden” (although it would separately be a match for “burdensome”). 
198. See Choi, supra note 36, at 423 (applying the same exclusion). 
199. E.g., Reportable Quantity Adjustment for Isophorone Diisocyanate, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,331 (Sept. 
11, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 355); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Modifications to 
Reformulated Gasoline Covered Area Provisions, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,398 (June 4, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 80). 
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Note that the terms selected require relatively intense engagement with 
legislation for a sentence to be considered an act of statutory interpretation. Most 
regulations will trivially mention some statute; the terms selected below aim to 
restrict positive results to serious attempts to interpret the statute, rather than 
casual references. 
 










3. Legislative History 
Congressional Reports 
 
conference report h.r. rept. 
conf. rep. h. r. rept. 
conf. rpt. h.r.rep. 
conf. rept. h.r.rpt. 
conf.rep. h.r.rept. 
conf.rpt. senate report 
conf.rept. s. rep. 
house report s. rpt. 
h. rep. s. rept. 
h. rpt. s.rep. 
h. rept. s.rpt. 
h.rep. s.rept. 
h.rpt. comm. rep. 
h.rept. comm. rpt. 
h.r. rep. comm. rept. 
h. r. rep. comm.rep. 
h.r. rpt. comm.rpt. 




200. The term “interpretative” is excluded from this count, although it contains “interpret” as a 
substring. 
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congressional hearing committee hearing 
congressional record senate hearing 
cong. rec. house hearing 
cong.rec. conference hearing 
rec. doc.  
 
Miscellaneous Legislative History 
 
legislative history s. subcomm.  
history of the legislation house committee  
conference committee h.r. comm.  
senate committee h. subcomm.  
s. comm.201 h. r. subcomm. 
4. Commenters 
Because the term “comment” returned many false positives, a more limited 




D. Distinguishing Interpretative and Legislative Regulations 
The line between interpretative and legislative regulations has changed over 
time, largely as a result of Mayo. Prior to Mayo, it was widely believed (including 
by the IRS) that legislative regulations were promulgated under specific grants of 
regulatory authority, whereas interpretative regulations followed from Treasury’s 
general authority to promulgate regulations under section 7805(a) of the Code.202 
The IRS explicitly disavowed this view after Mayo,203 instead applying the 
definition prevalent in administrative law outside of tax, that legislative 
regulations demand notice and comment whereas interpretative ones do not.204 
But even before Mayo, status as an interpretative regulation could be unclear. 
The IRS frequently (both before and after Mayo) cited section 7805 as the sole 
 
201. To avoid false positives, the text was pre-processed to exclude the term “pers. comm.”, an 
abbreviation for “personal communication.” E.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule 
to List the Vermilion Darter as Endangered, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,367 (Nov. 28, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 
17). 
202. Hickman, supra note 88, at 1545 (“Since long before Chevron, however, and consistent with the 
tax community’s categorization, the Treasury has taken the position that its general authority regulations are 
interpretative only . . . .”). 
203. I.R.S., supra note 88, § 2.1.1.2.8.1 (“Whether a regulation is promulgated under a specific grant of 
authority in the Internal Revenue Code does not govern whether the regulation is interpretative or legislative.”). 
204. I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, § 32.1.1.2.6.1 (Sept. 23, 2011) (“The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) exempts interpretative rules from the APA’s notice and comment requirements.”). 
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source of authority for its regulations, even when a more specific grant of 
regulatory authority existed.205 And after Mayo, internal IRS policy generally 
directs employees to conduct notice and comment for all Treasury regulations, 
including interpretative regulations.206 
Despite occasional fuzziness, the best line to separate legislative from 
interpretative regulations under the pre-Mayo understanding of these terms 
remains whether their authority derives from section 7805, or some other section 
of the Code.207 Accordingly, this Article categorizes Treasury regulations 
according to their underlying authority. This is relatively straightforward, because 
each Treasury regulation (excluding amendments and corrections) explicitly 
states the authority on which it relies.208 The authority for each regulation is cited 
in the Federal Register, as required by the APA.209 
For this Article, I programmed an algorithm to identify which regulations 
cited section 7805 as their sole authority (classifying these as interpretative 
regulations), cited sections of the Code other than 7805 as their sole authority 
(classifying these as legislative regulations), or cited both section 7805 and some 
other section of the Code (generally excluding these from the analysis). Only 
complete regulations were counted for purposes of this Article, so that 
amendments and corrections that did not cite any authority were excluded. 
Although the Federal Register XML data were of high quality, I individually 
reviewed each of the authorities cited in order to avoid any false positives or 
negatives. For purposes of the regression analysis, Treasury regulations that were 
entirely legislative were considered “other” (non-interpretative) regulations and 
were grouped with non-Treasury regulations, but Treasury regulations that cited 
both specific and general authority were dropped from the regression analysis 
altogether. Running the same regressions without dropping these specific-and-
general-authority regulations produces essentially identical results, with the 
coefficients on the variable of interest in each regression taking the same sign and 
statistical significance, and with the point estimates falling within 5% of those 
shown above. 
Table 9 summarizes the number of Treasury regulations of each type: 
 
 
205. Hickman, supra note 88, at 1544 n.27 (citing many cases where Treasury was explicitly directed to 
make rules regarding certain sections of the Code, but nonetheless cited section 7805(a) as the sole authority in 
its rulemaking). One former IRS official recounted to me that, prior to Mayo, he and the IRS considered 
essentially all regulations interpretative. 
206. DEPT. OF TREASURY, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE TAX REGULATORY PROCESS 1 (2019), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Policy-Statement-on-the-Tax-Regulatory-Process.pdf. 
207. See supra Section I.D; Hickman, supra note 88, at 1557 (“Although the practical difference is not 
always apparent, in [jurisdictions that accorded some Treasury regulations only National Muffler deference, 
rather than Chevron deference], specific authority regulations are given ‘controlling weight’ pursuant to 
Chevron while general authority regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a) are given only ‘considerable 
weight’ under National Muffler.”). 
208. See infra Appendix Section D (describing in greater detail the process the Article uses to separate 
interpretative and legislative regulations). 
209. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (2018). 
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Table 9: Number of Treasury Regulations by Type, 2000-2020 
 
Treasury Regulation Type N 
  
All Tax Regulations 1480 
Interpretative Tax Regulations 1096 
Legislative Tax Regulations 20 
Other Tax Regulations (citing both 
section 7805 and some other section 




Ideally, the IRS would conduct notice and comment by issuing proposed 
regulations and then inviting comments on those proposed regulations, before 
issuing final regulations that incorporate changes in response to comments. In 
reality, the IRS often feels obliged to issue temporary regulations with immediate 
effect and then subsequently requests comments on those temporary regulations. 
The IRS claims that these temporary regulations fall within the “good cause” 
exception of the APA.210 Some critics have argued that Treasury thereby fails to 
comply with the APA and that many of these temporary regulations are invalid.211 
Nevertheless, because the IRS continues to maintain that its procedures regarding 
temporary regulations comply with the APA, and therefore that these regulations 
receive Chevron deference like any others, temporary regulations are not treated 
differently from other regulations for purposes of this Article. 
Another nuance is that Treasury declines to open a small minority of 
regulations to notice and comment altogether.212 These regulations are generally 
exempt from notice and comment requirements under the APA’s good cause 
exception or its procedural rule exception.213 Because these regulations are rare 
and hard to identify at scale, and because Treasury’s beliefs regarding whether 
these regulations should receive Chevron deference are unclear (in many cases, 
they amend or remove existing regulations, making it difficult to apply or not 
apply Chevron to them independently), they are not removed from the sample 
for purposes of this Article. To the extent that these regulations are not eligible 
for Chevron deference, including them in the sample will tend to attenuate the 
measured effect of Chevron, implying that point estimates will be too small in 
magnitude.  
 
210. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 206, at 1. 
211. Supra note 137. 
212. Hickman, supra note 93, at 1749 (finding that 11 out of 232 regulations from a three-year sample 
were neither preceded nor followed by notice and comment). 
213. Id. at 1789 (“In sum, most of the projects in which Treasury issued final regulations without the 
benefit of notice and comment seem to be good candidates for either the procedural rule exception or the good 
cause exception.”). Of the eleven in Hickman’s sample, Treasury (incorrectly) attempted to argue that one did 
not require notice and comment because it was an interpretative rule. Id. at 1787. 
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The conspicuous shortage of pure legislative tax regulations—those that 
solely draw their authority from some section of the tax code other than section 
7805—precludes another potential robustness check, namely analysis that solely 
considers tax regulations, using interpretative tax regulations as the treatment and 
legislative tax regulations as the control group. Because pure legislative tax 
regulations are so rare (18 in this sample), N is too small to conduct a meaningful 
analysis.  
A final potential issue is Treasury’s unusual format for citing statutory 
authority. Many Treasury regulations that cite only Section 7805 of the Code 
(making them prima facie interpretative) specifically cite “Section 7805 * * *.”214 
According to one source, the three asterisks are “an agreed-upon signal from the 
I.R.S. to the Office of the Federal Register (O.F.R.)” to incorporate by reference 
specific authority cited at the beginning of the relevant volume of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR). As a result, if the relevant volume of the CFR cited 
specific authority, a regulation citing “7805 * * *” could arguably be legislative, 
rather than interpretative.215 If so, many of the regulations classified as 
interpretative by this Article might actually be legislative. If legislative tax 
regulations underwent no change in deference status before and after Mayo 
(because they have always received Chevron deference), then including those 
covertly legislative regulations in the category of interpretative tax regulations 
could introduce additional noise in the regression, attenuating the measured 
effect of Mayo on truly interpretative tax regulations. As a result, point estimates 
for the magnitude of Mayo’s effects may be underestimates, and the true effect of 
Mayo and Chevron might actually be greater.216 
One method to test whether the inclusion of three-asterisk regulations has 
biased the results is simply to conduct the regressions, excluding three-asterisk 
regulations from the treatment group. In these regressions, the main results 
presented in this Article—the changes in normative terms, statutory terms, 
preamble length, and references to commenters—remained statistically 
significant and in most cases increased in magnitude, except that the first-step 
regression regarding statutory terms lost statistical significance (although it 
remained negative). In general, these results suggest that Treasury may have 
 
214. These asterisks generally appear when a regulatory document amends an existing regulation. E.g., 
The Solely for Voting Stock Requirement in Certain Corporate Reorganizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,805, 31,806 
(May 19, 2000) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); Section 6038—Returns Required With Respect to Controlled 
Foreign Partnerships , 67 Fed. Reg. 78,174, 78,175 (Dec. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602). 
215. Hickman, supra note 86, at 1753 n.99 (noting that she has received this comment, but adding that 
the supposed use of the three asterisks to indicate specific authority is “inherently cryptic” and arguing that it 
does not satisfy the authority citation requirement of section 553(b)(2) of the APA). See also I.R.S., INTERNAL 
REVENUE MANUAL, § 32.1.5.7.4.2, exs. 1, 2 (Aug. 11, 2004) (arguably following this custom, albeit without 
explanation). 
216. It is also theoretically possible that the inclusion of the three-asterisk regulations introduces some 
sort of omitted variable bias that causes the sign of the effect to be misestimated (e.g., to estimate the causal 
effect on normative term frequency as positive rather than negative). As noted further below, this is not 
consistent with the data, and moreover it is difficult to imagine why this would be so. 
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expected Chevron deference for at least a subset of the three-asterisk regulations 
and that the results in this Article, while directionally correct, may actually 
underestimate effect size.  
Nevertheless, this restricted regression is less reliable because of the 
relatively small number of tax regulations that solely cite section 7805 without 
including asterisks (30 out of 1084), as well as lingering uncertainty about the 
formal meaning of the asterisks and the extent to which this practice complied 
with the APA.217 Even assuming that the IRS’s informal signal to the OFR was 
internally understood and did comply with the APA, it is unclear which authority 
cited in the relevant CFR volume is intended to be picked up by the asterisks. It 
appears that many regulations simply cited “Section 7805 * * *” as a matter of 
course, making it impossible to determine which were intended to be legislative 
and which were intended to be interpretative. Consequently, this Article still 
considers three-asterisk regulations to be interpretative for purposes of the main 
analysis, but this issue provides additional reason to treat the point estimates in 
this Article as lower bounds in magnitude. 
E. Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset used in this Article includes 467 separate agencies. The number 
of regulations per agency is not normally distributed—the most prolific regulator, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), produced 15,262 regulations during 
the time frame studied, around 22% of the total. Additional descriptive statistics 
regarding the data and variables are below. 
 
 
217. See supra note 215. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics on Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables N218 Mean Median Min Max σ 
Normative Term Frequency (per 
Million Words) 
69,870 185.8 0 0 35,714 621.5 
Statutory Term Frequency (per 
Million Words) 
69,870 107.7 0 0 40,000 703.0 
Legislative History Term 
Frequency (per Million Words) 
69,870 10.68 0 0 16,129 151.9 
Commenter Term Frequency 
(per Million Words) 
69,870 599.0 0 0 36,145 1910 
Preamble Word Count 69,956 1352 765 0 35,245 1860 
Regulation Word Count 69,956 735.8 225 0 34,822 1588 
Reading Level 69,956 13.2 13.4 -22.21 61.55 2.138 
Democratic Administration 69,956 0.384 0 0 1 0.486 
 
Table 11 lists the number of regulations in the dataset per year, as well as a 
breakdown of the number of regulations issued by each of the ten most prolific 
agencies, which includes the IRS. In order, these agencies are: the FAA, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Coast Guard, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the IRS, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS). 
Note that the number of regulations issued by agencies may not capture 
every dimension of the agency’s activities. For example, while the FAA issued 
over thirteen times more regulations than the IRS in the period studied in this 
Article, FAA preambles are generally shorter, and the word count of those 




218. N varies because a small number of regulations lack preambles, making it impossible to calculate 
term frequency (because the term frequency would be zero divided by zero). These observations are dropped 
from the regression analysis when term frequency is used. 
219. FAA preambles had a total of 12,133,693 words, versus 2,018,494 for the IRS. 
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Table 11: Number of Regulations for Top 10 Agencies by Regulations 
Promulgated, 2000-2020 
 





















2000 3708 871 488 224 267 331 188 98 44 40 78 
2001 3597 783 596 364 275 309 120 65 51 45 61 
2002 3682 703 526 405 269 302 133 103 68 54 90 
2003 3731 861 481 353 254 268 153 94 83 66 81 
2004 3630 905 456 328 259 277 163 85 81 65 75 
2005 3518 896 471 301 279 222 112 92 68 71 59 
2006 3355 739 458 295 298 186 127 91 69 89 80 
2007 3222 755 431 311 288 101 130 87 78 79 71 
2008 3431 785 462 285 322 155 108 72 89 81 46 
2009 3105 632 408 305 279 126 95 63 72 46 50 
2010 3200 711 428 377 302 95 86 60 98 40 33 
2011 3372 699 461 445 284 122 90 65 89 61 43 
2012 3298 665 580 531 278 104 73 42 73 45 26 
2013 3263 763 476 504 258 124 68 70 54 42 29 
2014 3206 629 495 482 287 129 87 63 52 60 32 
2015 2987 560 514 447 276 79 78 44 35 44 27 
2016 3363 683 500 429 301 79 116 60 30 61 21 
2017 3086 701 550 507 279 102 87 35 25 21 15 
2018 3153 720 482 556 283 120 86 50 28 15 19 
2019 2713 507 446 392 265 85 47 52 23 43 7 
2020 2955 694 412 201 294 114 39 41 27 48 11 
Total 69,575 15,262 10,121 8042 5897 3430 2186 1432 1237 1116 954 
F. Non-Normal Distribution of Term Frequencies 
The most common form of regression analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, assumes that regression residuals are homoskedastic and normally 
distributed.220 However, these assumptions are implausible for the data analyzed 
in this Article. The term frequencies described in this Article are (1) 
semicontinuous, meaning that they cannot be less than zero with respect to any 
text, but can vary continuously above zero; (2) zero-inflated, meaning that there 
is a disproportionate quantity of texts that have a term frequency of zero; and (3) 
log-normal, meaning that they do not follow a normal distribution even for term 
frequencies above zero, although they are normally distributed when log-
 
220. Jacob Cohen et al., Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral 
Sciences 480 (3d ed. 2003). 
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transformed.221 All these features make the assumptions of normally distributed 
and homoskedastic residuals unlikely.222  
Table 10 shows the problem of zero-inflation by noting that for each of the 
term frequencies studied, the median value is zero. The problem can also be seen 
in the histograms below, in Figure 13: 
 
Figure 13: Histograms of Dependent Variables, 2000-2020 
 
 
Figure 13 shows that most of the data are significantly zero-inflated—a 
substantial majority of the regulatory preambles have zero uses of statutory, 
normative, legislative history, and commenter terms, respectively. (The data are 
not zero-inflated with respect to preamble length, however.223) In addition, the 
nonzero term frequencies are also not normally distributed—they are log-normal. 
The log-normality of the nonzero term frequencies can be demonstrated by 
log-transforming them as follows for each term frequency 𝑦: 
 
𝑦h = 𝑙𝑜𝑔	(𝑦) (3) 
 
221. Preamble length is a count variable, so it is not semicontinuous or zero-inflated, but it is log-
normal, as described below, and it cannot be less than zero. 
222. While these distributional features describe the dependent variable and not the residuals, they 
affect the distribution of residuals as well—for example, a hard cutoff at zero means that the distribution of 
residuals is likely to have a left cutoff with a long right tail. 
223. Unsurprisingly, very few regulations are promulgated without a preamble—86 out of 69,956 in 
the sample. 
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After log-transformation, all of the regression dependent variables become 
approximately normally distributed, as Figure 14 shows. This motivates the choice 
of the log link discussed in Section H of the Appendix. 
 
Figure 14: Logged Histograms of Dependent Variables, 2000-2020 
 
 
As the following Section describes, two-part regression addresses issues of 
semi-continuity, zero-inflation, and log-normality, making it the appropriate 
choice of model for the term frequencies in this Article. The preamble length 
regressions use a generalized linear model (GLM) that is similarly adapted to log-
normally distributed count data. 
G. Regression Models: OLS, GLM, and Two-Part Regression 
This Article implements a difference-in-differences study through regression 
analysis. It takes each rule promulgated between 2000 and 2020 as a separate 
observation. In addition to controls, it analyzes three variables of special interest: 
(1) a dummy variable coded as 1 if the regulation was promulgated after Mayo 
(regardless of agency), and 0 otherwise; (2) a dummy variable coded as 1 if the 
regulation was an interpretative tax regulation, and 0 otherwise; and (3) an 
interaction variable, generated by multiplying the prior two variables. Five 
different dependent variables are studied through the regressions: the term 
frequency of statutory, normative, legislative history, and commenter terms, and 
the length of regulatory preambles. 
 The coefficient generated in the regression for the post-Mayo dummy 
represents the change after Mayo for regulations other than interpretative tax 
regulations. The coefficient for the interpretative tax regulation dummy 
represents the difference between interpretative tax regulations and other 
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regulations prior to Mayo. And the key variable of interest for purposes of our 
study is the interaction term. The coefficient on the interaction term represents 
the additional marginal effect that Mayo had specifically on interpretative tax 
regulations. The interaction term is therefore the treatment effect or difference in 
differences—the difference between interpretative tax regulations and other 
regulations, in the differences before and after Mayo. 
In addition to the dummy variables and interaction term, subsequent 
regressions also include control variables for time trends (piecewise, pre- and 
post-Mayo), length of the regulation associated with the preamble, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the preamble has a high reading level or a low reading 
level,224 a dummy reflecting the party of the sitting president when the regulation 
was issued, and dummy variables identifying the type of regulation (rule, notice, 
or other225). The basic OLS model is as follows: 
 
𝑦< = 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M ∙ 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 	 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝜖<  
(4) 
 
Controlling for the time trend (separately estimated for the periods before 
and after Mayo), the model is: 
 
𝑦< = 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M ∙ 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 	 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽% ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝜖<       
(5) 
Finally, with full controls, the model is: 
 
𝑦< = 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 
𝛽M ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 
𝛽% ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽P ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< + 
𝛽R ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< + 𝛽U ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< + 
𝛽( ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A" ∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝜖< 
 
(6) 
However, OLS models are problematic for the dataset in this Article, for the 
reasons discussed above. Consequently, I instead primarily rely on a GLM (for 
the preamble length regression) or a two-part regression model (for the term 
frequency regressions). The two-part model has become standard in a variety of 
 
224. A preamble is designated as having a high reading level if its Coleman-Liau reading level is 
greater than 12, meaning reading appropriate for someone with a high school degree or more. The main benefit 
of controlling for reading level is that it controls for regulations with trivially short preambles, which have very 
low (and sometimes negative) reading levels. Thus, the use of a dummy variable, which captures the variation 
of interest in reading level despite relatively low variance in reading level among preambles (the standard 
deviation is 2.14). 
225. “Other” documents are not explicitly controlled for, but they form the baseline when a document 
is neither a rule nor a notice. 
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fields with semicontinuous data that present zero-inflation as well as log-
normality.226  
A two-part regression model separates estimates of term frequency into two 
parts. First, a logit or probit model estimates the likelihood that term frequency 
is nonzero.227 Second, an OLS model or GLM estimates term frequency 
magnitude conditional on term frequency being nonzero. Intuitively, one could 
imagine an agency making an initial decision on whether to conduct statutory (or 
normative, or legislative history) analysis at all, and then making a second 
separate decision about how much to discuss the statute (or normative concerns, 
or legislative history).  
For this Article, I use the two-part model developed by Naihua Duan et al.228 
and implemented by Federico Belotti et al.229 For the first part, I specify a basic 
logit model as follows230: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑡𝑓< = 0)] = 𝛽"A + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$A ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽MA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝜖< 
(7) 
The second part of the regression uses a GLM. A GLM is a generalized 
version of an OLS model that relaxes some of the assumptions used in OLS 
regression, specifically the assumptions of linear functional form and 
homoskedasticity.231 The basic GLM is as follows (noting that references to “log” 
in this Article are to the natural logarithm, sometimes also denoted “ln”)232: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑦<|𝑦< > 0] = 𝛽"$ + 𝛽A$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$$ ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝜖< 
(8) 
 
226. Partha Deb & Edward C. Norton, Modeling Health Care Expenditures and Use, 39 ANN. REV. 
PUB. HEALTH 489, 495 (2018) (“The health econometrics literature has settled on the two-part model as the 
best way to model a dependent variable with a large mass at zero and many positive values.”). For early 
examples of the two-part model, see generally J.A. Cole & J.D.F. Sherriff, Some Single- and Multi-Site Models 
of Rainfall Within Discrete Time Increments, 17 J. HYDROLOGY 97 (1972) (applying an early version of a two-
part regression model to estimate rainfall); Naihua Duan et al., Choosing Between the Sample-Selection Model 
and the Multi-Part Model, 2 J. BUS. & ECON STATS. 283 (1984) (applying a two-part model to estimate 
healthcare expenditures). 
227. A probit model may also be used. Id. at 496 (“This choice is generally innocuous in that there is 
never a substantial difference between logit and probit.”). 
228. Duan et al., supra note 226. 
229. Federico Belotti et al., Twopm: Two-Part Models, 15 STATA J. 3 (2015). 
230. See Yongi Min & Alan Agresti, Random Effect Models for Repeated Measures of Zero-Inflated 
Count Data, 5 STATISTICAL MODELLING. 1, 11 (specifying a similar model).  
231. Deb & Norton, supra note 226, at 494-95 (“The GLM generalizes the ordinary linear regression 
model by allowing the expectation of the outcome variable to be a function (known as the link function) of the 
linear index of covariates, not simply a linear function of the index. Expenditure data, for example, often fit best 
with a log link, meaning that the natural logarithm of the expected value of the dependent variable is modeled 
as the linear index . . . . In addition, GLMs also explicitly model the heteroskedasticity. GLMs allow the variance 
of the outcome to be a function of its predicted value by the choice of an appropriate distribution family.”). 
232. See Min & Agresti, supra note 230, at 11. 
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The two models, including time trend controls, are: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑦< = 0)] = 𝛽"A + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$A ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽MA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽NA ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%A ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝜖< 
(9) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑦<|𝑦< > 0] = 𝛽"$ + 𝛽A$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 
𝛽$$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝜖<  
(10) 
Finally, including full controls, the models are: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑦< = 0)] = 𝛽"A + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$A ∙  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽MA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽NA ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%A ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 
𝛽PA ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< + 𝛽RA ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< + 
𝛽UA ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< + 𝛽(A ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A"A ∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝜖< 
(11) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑦<|𝑦< > 0] = 𝛽"$ + 𝛽A$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$$ ∙  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽P$ ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< +  
𝛽R$ ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< + 𝛽U$ ∙  
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< + 𝛽($ ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A"$ ∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝜖< 
(12) 
 
In addition to the separate estimates of the marginal effect of each 
independent variable in the first and second part of the two-part regression, we 
can combine the two marginal effects to calculate the overall average marginal 
effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. The formula for 
this calculation, of the effect of any independent variable 𝑥<on dependent variable 
𝑦<, is233: 
 
𝑦< = 𝑦k<|𝑥< = (?̂?<|𝑥<) ∙ (𝑦k<|𝑦< > 0, 𝑥<) (13) 
Two-part regression is used for every regression except for the regression 
using preamble length as its dependent variable, because preamble length in the 
sample is log-normal but not zero-inflated. Consequently, a simple GLM 
regression is used for preamble length. 
Because the absolute values of changes are difficult to interpret without 
understanding average values before and after, this Article also presents semi-
elasticities, reflecting the percentage change in the dependent variable given a 
one-unit change in a relevant independent variable. Modifying Equation 13 to 
 
233. Belotti et al., supra note 229, at 7. 
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calculate semi-elasticities (in order to estimate percentage changes in the 
dependent variable): 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔	(𝑦<) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔	(𝑦k<)|𝑥< = (?̂?<|𝑥<) ∙ (𝑙𝑜𝑔	(𝑦k<)|𝑦< > 0, 𝑥<) (14) 
Given a retransformed semi-elasticity from Equation 14, a change in the 
associated dummy variable from 0 to 1 corresponds to the following percentage 
change in the dependent variable234: 
 
100 ∙ (𝑒m − 1) (15) 
Finally, note that all regressions in this Article, whether OLS, GLM, or two-
part, are conducted using standard errors clustered by agency. 
H. Choice of GLM Link Function and Distribution Family 
Each GLM (whether standalone or second-step) requires explicit 
specification of the appropriate link function and distribution family, allowing it 
to accurately model non-linearity and heteroskedasticity.235 Although GLM 
regression requires additional analysis and is somewhat more computationally 
demanding, it is more accurate and will produce better results when OLS 
assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity do not hold. 
In order to determine the appropriate distribution family for the GLM steps 
(and the GLM regression on preamble length), I use a modified Park test. The 
modified Park test is conducted using regression means (predicted values) and 
residuals from a two-part regression specified using a particular link function 
(here, a log link) and a hypothesized distribution family (here, a Poisson or 
Gamma distribution). The modified Park test evaluates the manner in which the 
square of the regression residuals (the variance) varies with the natural logarithm 
of the regression’s predicted values (the mean). If a distribution is homoskedastic, 
as is assumed in OLS regression, then there should be no relationship between 
variance and mean. A modified Park test uses the following model, where 𝑦k< is 
the predicted value from a regression (in the case of two-part regression, the 
second part) and ri is the residual from the regression (that is, 𝑟< = 𝑦< − 𝑦no): 
 
𝑟<$ = 𝜃< ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦k<) + 𝜖< (16) 
The model in Equation 16 is evaluated in a GLM regression with parameters 
matching the initial hypothesized regression (a log link and either a Gamma or 
Poisson distribution family). 
 
234. Eyal Frank, Log-Linear Regressions: Three Things To Keep In Mind, EYAL FRANK (Aug. 22, 
2015), http://www.eyalfrank.com/log-linear-regressions-three-things-to-keep-in-mind [https://perma.cc/735R-
XJP6]. 
235. However, standard GLM only allows us to model heteroskedasticity that itself follows one of 
several functional forms: Gaussian, Poisson, Gamma, or Wald (also known as inverse-Gaussian). 
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The appropriate distribution family for the GLM regression can be 
evaluated based on the estimated value of 𝜃<. If 𝜃< ≈ 0, that implies no 
relationship between mean and variance, so that a Gaussian distribution should 
be used, as with OLS regression. If 𝜃< ≈ 1, then a Poisson distribution should be 
used. If 𝜃< ≈ 2, then a Gamma distribution should be used. And if 𝜃< ≈ 3	then a 
Wald distribution (also known as an inverse-Gaussian distribution) should be 
used.236 Table 12 shows the results of the modified Park tests and the implied 
distribution families. The fact that each regression uses a Gamma distribution 
family affirms the choice not to use OLS in the second step of two-part 
regression. 
 
Table 12: Results of Modified Park Tests and Distribution Family 
 
Dependent Variable 𝜃< Distribution Family 
Normative 2.308 Gamma 
Statutory 2.504 Gamma 
Legislative History 1.884 Gamma 
Preamble Length 1.539 Gamma 
Commenter 1.602 Gamma 
 
Because the non-zero data in this study are log-normal,237 I use a log-link 
function (reflected by the log-transformations of the dependent variables in the 
equations above. In order to support that the log link was the appropriate choice, 
I plot residuals against the linear predictor for each GLM regression.238 If GLM 
assumptions are met, then the conditional mean function should be constant 
across the residual plot.239  
 
 
236. Deb & Norton, supra note 226, at 497. 
237. See supra Appendix Section F. 
238. The trend lines are produced with locally estimated scatterplot smoothing. 
239. JOHN FOX & SANFORD WEISBERG, AN R COMPANION TO APPLIED REGRESSION 320 (2011). 
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Figure 15: Residual Plots by GLM Dependent Variable 
 
 
Figure 15 shows that the conditional means remain roughly constant across 
each residual plot, with deviations only at the extremes, driven by outliers. This 
supports the use of the log link in each of the GLM regressions and suggests that 
OLS regression (which assumes a Gaussian distribution family and an identity 
link) would have been inappropriate. 
I. Regression Tables 
This Section of the Appendix contains full results for the regressions 
described in this Article. Note that while many of the key interaction term 
coefficients are statistically significant and large in magnitude, the R2 values 
(including McFadden’s pseudo-R2, an analogous statistic for logistic and GLM 
models that reflects the improvement in the fitted model’s performance over a 
naïve baseline model) are relatively low. Intuitively, this means that although 
Mayo did have a substantial effect, the model is far from providing perfect 
predictions of preamble language. This makes sense: we should expect the actual 
substance of any regulation, rather than various summary statistics, to primarily 
drive the language chosen for the preamble.  
For legibility, some of the tables are divided across two pages, as noted.
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Table 13: OLS Regression Results for Normative and Statutory Terms, 2000-
2020 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Normative Normative Normative Statutory Statutory Statutory 
Post-Mayo 12.70 -32,450*** -38,241** 28.03 8560 5713 
 (26.24) (9,007) (15,270) (17.69) (7047) (7757) 
Interpretative Tax 
Reg 
-73.35* -69.85* -134.6*** 47.28** 45.97* 22.41 
(37.39) (37.30) (34.52) (23.37) (24.05) (24.34) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
104.8*** 103.4*** 104.2*** -77.47*** -76.38*** -82.74*** 
(26.24) (24.42) (26.20) (17.69) (17.32) (15.83) 
Year 
 
 -9.339** -8.882**  3.510 3.598 
 (4.120) (4.353)  (2.786) (2.738) 
Year x Post-Mayo  16.16*** 19.02**  -4.252 -2.841 
  (4.480) (7.584)  (3.507) (3.859) 
Regulation 
Length 
  0.0299*** 
(0.00736) 




  128.7*** 
(35.26) 




  28.07   11.02 
  (23.59)   (9.489) 
Constant 181.4*** 18,904** 17,826** 91.34*** -6946 -7073 
 (37.39) (8,263) (8,739) (23.37) (5570) (5481) 
Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
       
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
R2 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the term frequency of either 
normative or statutory terms as the dependent variable, as indicated. Term frequency is 
measured in terms per million words. Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: Two-Part Regression Results for Normative Terms, 2000-2020 
(Part 1, Continued on Next Page) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Logit GLM Avg Logit GLM 
      
Post-Mayo 0.219* -0.109** 0.0680 -43.26 -135.0*** 
 (0.123) (0.0519) (0.109) (40.18) (22.96) 
Interpretative Tax Reg -0.260 -0.300*** -0.510** -0.257 -0.307*** 
 (0.305) (0.0763) (0.246) (0.310) (0.0689) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
0.591*** 0.199*** 0.676*** 0.592*** 0.181*** 
(0.123) (0.0519) (0.126) (0.116) (0.0497) 
Year 
 
   -0.00784 -0.0433*** 
   (0.0187) (0.0108) 
Year x Post-Mayo    0.0216 0.0672*** 
    (0.0200) (0.0114) 
Regulation Length      
      
High Reading Level      
      
Democratic 
Administration 
     
     
Constant -1.530*** 6.927***  14.18 93.64*** 
 (0.305) (0.0763)  (37.39) (21.60) 
Fixed Effects No No No No No 
      
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2 0.002 0.003  0.002 0.003 
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and 
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the 
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. 
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Table 14: Two-Part Regression Results for Normative Terms, 2000-2020 
(Part 2, Continued from Previous Page) 
 
Variables (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Avg Logit GLM Avg 
     
Post-Mayo -169.9*** -51.12 -142.2*** -183.5** 
 (40.59) (78.74) (33.29) (72.93) 
Interpretative Tax Reg -0.514** -0.999*** -0.205*** -1.011*** 
 (0.247) (0.219) (0.0504) (0.159) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
0.659*** 0.819*** 0.204*** 0.864*** 
(0.119) (0.215) (0.0412) (0.212) 
Year 
 
-0.0496*** -0.00626 -0.0406*** -0.0456** 
(0.0188) (0.0225) (0.0102) (0.0210) 
Year x Post-Mayo 0.0846*** 0.0255 0.0707*** 0.0913** 
 (0.0202) (0.0391) (0.0165) (0.0362) 
Regulation Length  0.000210*** -2.35e-05** 0.000146** 
  (6.40e-05) (1.05e-05) (6.22e-05) 
High Reading Level  2.178*** -0.664*** 1.092*** 
  (0.439) (0.150) (0.287) 
Democratic 
Administration 
 0.0753 0.0612 0.122 
 (0.0968) (0.0496) (0.0947) 
Constant  8.249 89.18***  
  (45.31) (20.39)  
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2  0.080 0.003  
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” 
and “GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while 
the “Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both 
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Table 15: Two-Part Regression Results for Statutory Terms, 2000-2020 (Part 
1, Continued on Next Page) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Logit GLM Avg Logit GLM 
Post-Mayo 0.437*** -0.128** 0.268** 7.478 79.92* 
 (0.147) (0.0512) (0.134) (54.72) (42.98) 
Interpretative Tax Reg 0.747** -0.246* 0.429 0.746** -0.262* 
 (0.300) (0.145) (0.327) (0.297) (0.140) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
-0.467*** -0.288*** -0.710*** -0.466*** -0.272*** 
(0.147) (0.0512) (0.134) (0.149) (0.0555) 
Year 
 
   0.00309 0.0345** 
   (0.0211) (0.0143) 
Year x Post-Mayo    -0.00351 -0.0399* 
    (0.0273) (0.0214) 
Regulation Length      
      
High Reading Level      
      
Democratic 
Administration 
     
      
Constant -2.466*** 7.062***  -8.657 -62.05** 
 (0.300) (0.145)  (42.35) (28.71) 
Fixed Effects No No No No No 
      
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2 0.007 0.010  0.007 0.010 
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and 
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the 
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. 
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Two-Part Regression Results for Statutory Terms, 2000-2020 (Part 
2, Continued from Previous Page) 
 
Variables 
(6) (7) (8) (9)  
Avg Logit GLM Avg  
Post-Mayo 86.68 -30.99 92.16 64.15  
 (65.60) (82.05) (57.65) (93.47)  
Interpretative Tax Reg 0.412 0.287 0.143 0.402*  
 (0.322) (0.184) (0.122) (0.212)  
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
-0.693*** -0.474*** -0.235*** -0.664***  
(0.137) (0.137) (0.0423) (0.122)  
Year 
 
0.0373 0.00648 0.0254 0.0313  
(0.0239) (0.0210) (0.0195) (0.0273)  
Year x Post-Mayo -0.0431 0.0155 -0.0459 -0.0318  
 (0.0327) (0.0408) (0.0287) (0.0465)  
Regulation Length  0.000153*** -7.71e-05*** 6.14e-05  
  (3.75e-05) (1.44e-05) (4.06e-05)  
High Reading Level  1.584*** -1.578*** -0.147  
  (0.274) (0.225) (0.316)  
Democratic 
Administration 
 0.194* -0.0773** 0.0984  
 (0.0997) (0.0385) (0.0950)  
Constant  -17.41 -41.90   
  (41.98) (39.28)   
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes  
      
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489  
McFadden’s R2  0.050 0.006   
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and 
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the 
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. 
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






Post-Mayo 172.1* 20,481 7509 -139.4 -70,460 -72,120 
 (93.12) (21,485) (23,715) (167.4) (68,175) (56,963) 
Interpretative 
Tax Reg 
159.5 152.7 -486.4*** 931.1*** 941.2*** 642.4*** 
(172.2) (171.7) (153.0) (203.9) (193.0) (218.0) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
411.7*** 420.8*** 439.7*** 202.1 194.4 216.6 
(93.12) (88.58) (67.73) (167.4) (156.4) (169.3) 
Year 
 
 17.83** 19.51**  -26.96 -28.09 
 (6.995) (7.844)  (32.51) (32.58) 
Year x Post-
Mayo 
 -10.17 -3.766  35.03 35.86 
 (10.69) (11.79)  (33.91) (28.35) 
Regulation 
Length 
  0.284***   0.147*** 
  (0.0285)   (0.0249) 
High Reading 
Level 
  903.5***   316.6*** 
  (162.4)   (84.75) 
Democratic 
Administration 
  92.63***   1.484 
  (28.67)   (40.87) 
Constant 1273*** -34,476** -38,831** 646.7*** 54,701 56,306 
 (172.2) (14,062) (15,750) (203.9) (65,365) (65,384) 
Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
       
N 69,575 69,575 69,575 69,489 69,489 69,489 
R2 0.003 0.003 0.106 0.006 0.007 0.033 
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the preamble word count 
or term frequency of references to commenters as the dependent variable, as indicated. 
Term frequency is measured in terms per million words. Standard errors are clustered 
by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: GLM Regression Results for Preamble Length, 2000-2020 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post-Mayo 0.127* 18.42 16.88 16.91 
 (0.0739) (13.59) (17.78) (17.78) 
Interpretative Tax Reg 0.118 0.118 -0.580*** 15.55 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.101) (13.47) 
Post-Mayo x Interpretative  0.215*** 0.215*** 0.173** 0.259*** 
(0.0739) (0.0746) (0.0702) (0.0283) 
Year 
 
 0.0140** 0.0161** 0.0134** 
 (0.00618) (0.00757) (0.00544) 
Year x Post-Mayo  -0.00915 -0.00840 -0.00842 
  (0.00676) (0.00884) (0.00884) 
Regulation Length   0.000191*** 0.000191*** 
   (2.77e-05) (2.78e-05) 
High Reading Level   1.178*** 1.178*** 
   (0.185) (0.185) 
Democratic Administration   0.0645*** 0.0644*** 
  (0.0196) (0.0196) 
Year x Pre-Trend Slope    0.000146 
    (0.000121) 
Constant 7.149*** -20.83* -26.49* -26.72* 
 (0.135) (12.45) (15.20) (15.36) 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
     
N 69,575 69,575 69,575 69,575 
McFadden’s R2 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 
Note: The dependent variable in each column is the number of words per regulatory 
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Table 18: Two-Part Regression Results for Commenter Terms, 2000-2020 
(Part 1, Continued on Next Page) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Logit GLM Avg Logit GLM 
      
Post-Mayo -0.0359 -0.213* -0.243 -94.10 -40.05 
 (0.179) (0.119) (0.188) (72.31) (36.03) 
Interpretative Tax Reg 1.073*** 0.124 0.997*** 1.084*** 0.129 
 (0.262) (0.117) (0.271) (0.248) (0.108) 
Post-Mayo x Interpretative  -0.0307 0.293** 0.268 -0.0339 0.288*** 
(0.179) (0.119) (0.189) (0.166) (0.108) 
Year 
 
   -0.0248 -0.0224 
   (0.0337) (0.0156) 
Year x Post-Mayo    0.0468 0.0199 
    (0.0360) (0.0179) 
Regulation Length      
      
High Reading Level      
      
Democratic Administration      
      
Constant -1.481*** 8.158***  48.15 53.12* 
 (0.262) (0.117)  (67.76) (31.30) 
Fixed Effects No No No No No 
      
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2 0.004 0.005  0.005 0.005 
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and 
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the 
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. 
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18: Two-Part Regression Results for Commenter Terms, 2000-2020 
(Part 2, Continued from Previous Page) 
 
Variables 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
Avg Logit GLM Avg 
     
Post-Mayo -116.6* -85.06 -47.85* -117.1** 
 (67.52) (62.25) (28.80) (57.12) 
Interpretative Tax Reg 1.010*** 0.728*** 0.0532 0.646** 
(0.258) (0.280) (0.116) (0.272) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
0.260 0.0109 0.298*** 0.306* 
(0.173) (0.177) (0.111) (0.182) 
Year 
 
-0.0426 -0.0245 -0.0228 -0.0428 
(0.0311) (0.0347) (0.0165) (0.0323) 
Year x Post-Mayo 0.0580* 0.0423 0.0238* 0.0582** 
 (0.0336) (0.0310) (0.0143) (0.0284) 
Regulation Length  0.000184*** 2.52e-05** 0.000175*** 
  (3.10e-05) (1.18e-05) (2.77e-05) 
High Reading Level  1.274*** -0.258*** 0.778** 
  (0.341) (0.0889) (0.315) 
Democratic 
Administration 
 -0.00995 0.00466 -0.00343 
 (0.0570) (0.0652) (0.0799) 
Constant  45.86 53.82  
  (70.10) (32.95)  
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2  0.060 0.005  
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and 
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the 
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. 
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Table 19: Two-Part Regression Results for Legislative History Terms, 2000-
2020 (Part 1, Continued on Next Page) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Logit GLM Avg Logit GLM 
      
Post-Mayo -0.263** -0.169** -0.429*** 0.0408 30.60 
 (0.104) (0.0860) (0.134) (63.01) (69.13) 
Interpretative Tax 
Reg 
2.382*** 0.435*** 2.783*** 2.387*** 0.434*** 
(0.276) (0.0858) (0.292) (0.275) (0.0844) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
-0.222** -0.0510 -0.270** -0.230** -0.000241 
(0.104) (0.0860) (0.134) (0.105) (0.0732) 
Year 
 
   -0.0121 -0.0290* 
   (0.0185) (0.0172) 
Year x Post-Mayo    -8.74e-05 -0.0151 
   (0.0313) (0.0343) 
Regulation Length      
     
High Reading 
Level 
     
     
Democratic 
Administration 
     
     
Constant -4.247*** 6.602***  20.09 64.76* 
 (0.276) (0.0858)  (37.16) (34.51) 
Fixed Effects No No No No No 
      
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2 0.034 0.007  0.034 0.007 
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and 
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the 
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. 
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 





Table 19: Two-Part Regression Results for Legislative History Terms, 
2000-2020 (Part 2, Continued from Previous Page) 
 
Variables 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
Avg Logit GLM Avg 
     
Post-Mayo 30.64 -15.70 3.150 -12.33 
 (92.93) (62.74) (52.18) (80.90) 
Interpretative Tax 
Reg 
2.787*** 1.959*** 0.656*** 2.587*** 
(0.291) (0.230) (0.0712) (0.243) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
-0.227* -0.261*** 0.0238 -0.234* 
(0.127) (0.0926) (0.0862) (0.126) 
Year 
 
-0.0410 -0.00399 -0.0200 -0.0239 
(0.0251) (0.0153) (0.0130) (0.0199) 
Year x Post-Mayo -0.0152 0.00764 -0.00155 0.00598 
(0.0462) (0.0312) (0.0259) (0.0402) 
Regulation Length  0.000146*** -5.51e-05*** 8.93e-05*** 
 (2.39e-05) (1.04e-05) (2.59e-05) 
High Reading 
Level 
 2.446*** -1.220*** 1.191** 
 (0.334) (0.463) (0.569) 
Democratic 
Administration 
 0.169* 0.0388 0.205 
 (0.101) (0.111) (0.149) 
Constant  0.916 48.25*  
  (30.71) (26.13)  
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2  0.073 0.005  
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” 
and “GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while 
the “Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both 
columns. Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Shortened-Window Regression Results, 2006-2015 (Part 1, 
Continued on Next Page) 
 
Variables 











      
Post-Mayo 33.05 -73.85 -47.09 27.10 93.22 
 (86.18) (60.03) (91.79) (166.9) (100.9) 
Interpretative 
Tax Reg 
-0.949*** -0.235*** -1.004*** 0.375** 0.171 
(0.261) (0.0615) (0.198) (0.180) (0.170) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
0.442** 0.134** 0.493** -0.947*** -0.242*** 
(0.213) (0.0525) (0.197) (0.202) (0.0620) 
Year 
 
-0.00276 -0.0237 -0.0260 0.0369 0.0306 
(0.0376) (0.0285) (0.0417) (0.0323) (0.0442) 
Year x Post-
Mayo 
-0.0164 0.0367 0.0235 -0.0133 -0.0464 
(0.0429) (0.0299) (0.0457) (0.0830) (0.0502) 
Regulation 
Length 
0.000209*** -2.29e-05* 0.000146** 0.000167*** -7.43e-05*** 
(6.81e-05) (1.29e-05) (6.61e-05) (3.62e-05) (1.63e-05) 
High Reading 
Level 
2.215*** -0.557*** 1.236*** 1.746*** -1.711*** 
(0.418) (0.156) (0.275) (0.250) (0.270) 
Democratic 
Administration 
0.177** -0.0481 0.0951 -0.0190 -0.104 
(0.0804) (0.0913) (0.109) (0.148) (0.0882) 
Constant 1.212 55.15  -78.33 -51.93 
 (75.73) (57.18)  (64.92) (88.69) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 32,424 32,424 32,424 32,424 32,424 
McFadden’s R2 0.086 0.002  0.057 0.006 
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for 
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns 
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined” 
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard 
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 





Table 20: Shortened-Window Regression Results, 2006-2015 (Part 2, 
Continued from Previous Page) 
 
Variables 











      
Post-Mayo 117.6 30.76 -136.9 1.388 -111.4 
 (181.3) (28.90) (118.5) (49.93) (108.2) 
Interpretative 
Tax Reg 
0.509** -0.661*** 0.764*** 0.130* 0.759*** 
(0.240) (0.0949) (0.194) (0.0707) (0.187) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
-1.094*** 0.113*** -0.0349 0.188*** 0.159 
(0.175) (0.0371) (0.101) (0.0510) (0.0981) 
Year 
 
0.0637 0.0139 -0.0294 -0.0194 -0.0437 
(0.0531) (0.0129) (0.0407) (0.0246) (0.0413) 
Year x Post-
Mayo 
-0.0584 -0.0153 0.0681 -0.000730 0.0554 
(0.0902) (0.0144) (0.0589) (0.0248) (0.0538) 
Regulation 
Length 
7.56e-05* 0.000188*** 0.000177*** 1.94e-05 0.000165*** 
(4.03e-05) (2.88e-05) (3.34e-05) (1.34e-05) (3.08e-05) 
High Reading 
Level 
-0.140 1.156*** 1.073** -0.175* 0.709* 
(0.344) (0.199) (0.452) (0.105) (0.398) 
Democratic 
Administration 
-0.121 0.0373 -0.0291 0.130 0.106 
(0.160) (0.0403) (0.0763) (0.0808) (0.103) 
Constant  -21.97 55.99 46.97  
  (25.98) (82.18) (49.26)  
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 32,424 32,439 32,424 32,424 32,424 
McFadden’s R2  0.007 0.056 0.005  
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for 
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns 
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined” 
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard 
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Table 21: Winsorized Regression Results, 2000-2020 (Part 1, 
Continued on Next Page) 
 
Variables 











      
Post-Mayo -51.12 -88.93*** -130.2* -30.99 21.21 
 (78.74) (22.53) (68.68) (82.05) (18.32) 
Interpretative 
Tax Reg 
-0.999*** -0.138*** -0.944*** 0.287 0.115** 
(0.219) (0.0306) (0.154) (0.184) (0.0491) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
0.819*** 0.125*** 0.785*** -0.474*** -0.144*** 
(0.215) (0.0329) (0.211) (0.137) (0.0190) 
Year 
 
-0.00626 -0.0285*** -0.0336* 0.00648 0.00119 
(0.0225) (0.00630) (0.0194) (0.0210) (0.00636) 
Year x Post-
Mayo 
0.0255 0.0442*** 0.0648* 0.0155 -0.0105 
(0.0391) (0.0112) (0.0341) (0.0408) (0.00912) 
Regulation 
Length 
0.000210*** -2.13e-05*** 0.000148** 0.000153*** -4.34e-05*** 
(6.40e-05) (4.87e-06) (6.15e-05) (3.75e-05) (5.30e-06) 
High Reading 
Level 
2.178*** -0.224*** 1.533*** 1.584*** -0.320*** 
(0.439) (0.0627) (0.252) (0.274) (0.0612) 
Democratic 
Administration 
0.0753 0.00694 0.0677 0.194* -0.0476*** 
(0.0968) (0.0377) (0.0890) (0.0997) (0.0185) 
Constant 8.249 64.26***  -17.41 4.502 
 (45.31) (12.65)  (41.98) (12.79) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2 0.080 0.001  0.050 0.001 
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for 
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns 
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined” 
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard 
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 21: Winsorized Regression Results, 2000-2020 (Part 2, 
Continued from Previous Page) 
 











      
Post-Mayo -6.802 21.65 -85.06 -22.72 -91.94* 
 (75.82) (17.50) (62.25) (21.75) (53.90) 
Interpretative 
Tax Reg 
0.374** -0.494*** 0.728*** 0.171* 0.763*** 
(0.180) (0.0946) (0.280) (0.0885) (0.262) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
-0.573*** 0.140** 0.0109 0.212*** 0.221 
(0.116) (0.0635) (0.177) (0.0683) (0.159) 
Year 
 
0.00704 0.0142* -0.0245 -0.0102 -0.0302 
(0.0201) (0.00767) (0.0347) (0.00920) (0.0292) 
Year x Post-
Mayo 
0.00351 -0.0108 0.0423 0.0113 0.0457* 
(0.0377) (0.00870) (0.0310) (0.0108) (0.0268) 
Regulation 
Length 
9.51e-05** 0.000171*** 0.000184*** 1.83e-05* 0.000168*** 
(3.83e-05) (2.75e-05) (3.10e-05) (9.86e-06) (2.69e-05) 
High Reading 
Level 
1.111*** 1.169*** 1.274*** -0.227*** 0.809*** 
(0.230) (0.174) (0.341) (0.0557) (0.308) 
Democratic 
Administration 
0.128 0.0490*** -0.00995 -0.00998 -0.0181 
(0.0888) (0.0166) (0.0570) (0.0485) (0.0670) 
Constant  -22.64 45.86 28.37  
  (15.37) (70.10) (18.34)  
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 69,489 69,575 69,489 69,489 69,489 
McFadden’s R2  0.005 0.060 0.003  
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for 
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns 
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined” 
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard 
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22: Placebo Regression Results, 2000-2010 (Part 1, Continued 
on Next Page) 
 
Variables 











      
Post-2005 -41.07 -58.80 -92.60 -137.2 30.40 
 (85.56) (63.48) (94.78) (84.03) (83.17) 
Interpretative 
Tax Reg 
-1.045*** -0.155** -1.015*** 0.103 0.169** 
(0.213) (0.0645) (0.160) (0.218) (0.0844) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
0.137 -0.00545 0.107 0.235 0.0269 
(0.0834) (0.0663) (0.0980) (0.144) (0.121) 
Year 
 
-0.00413 -0.0654*** -0.0688** -0.0354 0.0432** 
(0.0302) (0.0181) (0.0308) (0.0233) (0.0186) 
Year x Post-
2005 
0.0204 0.0294 0.0462 0.0685 -0.0152 
(0.0426) (0.0316) (0.0472) (0.0419) (0.0414) 
Regulation 
Length 
0.000213*** -3.76e-05*** 0.000138** 0.000170*** -8.66e-05*** 
(5.77e-05) (1.16e-05) (5.61e-05) (3.55e-05) (1.30e-05) 
High Reading 
Level 
2.024*** -0.792*** 0.873*** 1.298*** -1.503*** 
(0.432) (0.164) (0.323) (0.288) (0.263) 
Democratic 
Administration 
0.112 0.0896 0.182 0.0599 -0.0464 
(0.132) (0.0667) (0.128) (0.149) (0.0699) 
Constant 3.498 138.9***  66.74 -77.59** 
 (60.62) (36.28)  (46.47) (37.38) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 36,514 36,514 36,514 36,514 36,514 
McFadden’s R2 0.076 0.003  0.040 0.006 
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for 
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns 
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined” column 
reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard errors are 
clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 





Table 22: Placebo Regression Results, 2000-2010 (Part 2, Continued 
from Previous Page) 
 
Variables 











      
Post-2005 -95.89 -8.411 130.0* 171.2* 276.5** 
 (114.4) (54.65) (66.54) (97.33) (112.2) 
Interpretative 
Tax Reg 
0.264 -0.534*** 0.644* 0.0180 0.539 
(0.220) (0.102) (0.335) (0.175) (0.344) 
Post-Mayo x 
Interpretative  
0.244 -0.162*** 0.110 0.138 0.227 
(0.178) (0.0615) (0.157) (0.113) (0.168) 
Year 
 
0.0106 0.0119 0.0240 0.0571*** 0.0765** 
(0.0285) (0.0152) (0.0378) (0.0200) (0.0372) 
Year x Post-
2005 
0.0478 0.00420 -0.0649* -0.0856* -0.138** 
(0.0570) (0.0273) (0.0332) (0.0486) (0.0560) 
Regulation 
Length 
6.99e-05* 0.000206*** 0.000192*** 1.97e-05 0.000176*** 
(3.80e-05) (3.93e-05) (3.31e-05) (1.59e-05) (3.18e-05) 
High Reading 
Level 
-0.308 1.320*** 1.397*** -0.352*** 0.779*** 
(0.367) (0.217) (0.254) (0.0969) (0.265) 
Democratic 
Administration 
0.00878 0.0213 0.0491 0.154*** 0.194*** 
(0.153) (0.0410) (0.0596) (0.0554) (0.0742) 
Constant  -18.24 -51.53 -106.4***  
  (30.50) (76.33) (40.24)  
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 36,514 36,597 36,514 36,514 36,514 
McFadden’s R2  0.007 0.062 0.005  
Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for 
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns 
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined” 
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard 
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
